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Abstract  
 
In Syria we see “cyber-armies”, consisting of both pro- and anti regime combatant non-state 
actors, waging organized (dis-) information campaigns in cyberspace. Pushing an agenda of 
subversion, it is a different and more conflictual form of cyber-interaction then analyzed 
before. Moving from online media as an outlet and opinion-sharing platform, unauthorized 
alterations and manipulation resembles traditional disinformation and propaganda campaigns. 
One of the first of its kind, this phenomenon requires closer inquiry. The research question 
guiding the thesis is therefore: “Why and how do non-state actors use cyberspace in modern 
conflict?”. Underpinning the research question is several assumptions that will be evaluated 
in the case study. Firstly, we must establish that non-state actors use cyberspace as 
component in their conflict strategy. Secondly, this thesis is founded in the belief that they 
use it as a tool of subversion aimed at undermining their opponent. These “warriors” actively 
sabotage, persecute, and spy on each other and perceived supporters by hacking accounts, 
defacing websites and manipulating social media outlets. Both parties uses online media to 
“sell their story” to the domestic and global audience but they also actively use hacking as a 
tool in conflict and manipulate how events are perceived. Moving from (social) media as an 
outlet for opinions to active and unauthorized alterations resembles disinformation and 
propaganda campaigns. 
 
Non-state actors use this domain in conflict situations to exploit it’s potential for waging soft 
wars as a form of conflict participation where agendas and narratives compete. The third 
assumption is that they promote a strategic narrative and soft power through guerrilla tactics. 
The case study will illustrate that the ways of real world conflicts thus are adapted to 
cyberspace to attack the center of gravity in the opponent. This finding leads the conclusion 
that the cyber warriors seen in Syria is not a new phenomenon, simply the adaption of old 
strategies in a new domain. Lastly, the thesis operates under the assumption that the reach 
and effectiveness (measured in the level of attention and number of attacks) of the non-state 
actors depend on the level of organization and resources. These assumptions can be 
summarized in five points: These assumptions can be summarized in five points: (1) Non-
state actors use cyberspace in conflicts;  (2) Subversion is the ultimate goal of their actions in 
cyberspace; (3) This is done by spreading a strategic narrative and build soft power; (4) To 
reach their goal, they use guerrilla tactics; (5) The effectiveness is determined by level of 
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organization and resources.	  This thesis will combine literature on soft power and subversion 
within the framework of conflict in cyberspace. It argues that cyberspace gives non-state 
actors a new domain to undermine the role of the state or the opposition, but that neither the 
nature of conflict or the nature of subversion enters a new paradigm. Strategic narratives are 
used in the hope of shaping the relative soft power like in traditional conflicts. Combining an 
element of surprise, rapid movement, and sabotage these actors rectify their weaknesses, and 
promote a particular strategic narrative to alter the relative soft power balance. We therefore 
see a potential trend of “soft war” moving into cyberspace.	  
 
In this thesis the data collection is done by combining a targeted literature search with a large 
collection of primary data on attacks completed during the course of the Syrian conflict. One 
of the main contributions of this work is therefore an extensive empirical record of cyber 
attacks during the Syrian conflict. All attacks meeting the criteria1 have been included in an 
attempt to provide as unbiased review as possible. This is presented in the appendix and 
forms the basis for the evaluation done in the analysis.  
 
This thesis finds some support for all the assumptions, but naturally any soft element to 
conflict is complicated to measure during an ongoing conflict2. What is clear from the case 
study is that non-state actors use cyberspace extensively in the Syrian conflict. It is the most 
socially mediated conflict in history (Lynch, Freelon, and Aday 2014), and this domain still 
enjoys the perception as a channel for unmediated information. Manipulation and 
justifications are therefore key messages spread to undermine the adversary’s position in the 
real world conflict. Ultimately they seek to subvert each other, aided by strategic narratives to 
shape the relative soft power balance. However, as they operate in an online maze and lack 
resources necessary for direct conflict, the actors studied use what can be called cyber 
guerrilla tactics. One of the actors studied, the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA), is rather 
successful in hindering information diffusion, implement espionage software, and infiltrate 
opposition online communication networks. The other party to the conflict, the opposition, is 
found however to have a much shorter empirical record and gains less attention. This is in 
great extent explained by their organizational proficiency. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Non-state actors of a certain level of organization, presenting a strategy over some time. The findings of others 
are included to increase the legitimacy of the research. 
2 the Syrian case provides a new development in the role of non-state actors in cybered conflicts, it was deemed 
2 the Syrian case provides a new development in the role of non-state actors in cybered conflicts, it was deemed 
the appropriate case As. This is further discussed later on.  
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Introduction  
 
In Syria we see “cyber-armies”, consisting of both pro- and anti regime combatant non-state 
actors, waging organized (dis-) information campaigns in cyberspace. Pushing an agenda of 
subversion, it is a different and more conflictual form of cyber-interaction then analyzed 
before. Moving from online media as an outlet and opinion-sharing platform, unauthorized 
alterations and manipulation resembles traditional disinformation and propaganda campaigns. 
One of the first of its kind, this phenomenon requires closer inquiry. The research question 
guiding the thesis is therefore: “Why and how do non-state actors use cyberspace in modern 
conflict?”. Underpinning the research question is several assumptions that will be evaluated 
in the case study. Firstly, we must establish that non-state actors use cyberspace as 
component in their conflict strategy. Secondly, this thesis is founded in the belief that they 
use the as a tool of subversion aimed at undermining their opponent. These “warriors” 
actively sabotage, persecute, and spy on each other and perceived supporters by hacking 
accounts, defacing websites and manipulating social media outlets. Both parties uses online 
media to “sell their story” to the domestic and global audience but they also actively use 
hacking as a tool in conflict and manipulate how events are perceived. Moving from (social) 
media as an outlet for opinions to active and unauthorized alterations resembles 
disinformation and propaganda campaigns. 
 
Cyberspace also allows for the inclusion of more actors. Non-state actors use this domain in 
conflict situations to exploit it’s potential for waging soft wars as a form of conflict 
participation where agendas and narratives compete. The third assumption is therefore that 
they do so to promote a strategic narrative and soft power through guerrilla tactics. The case 
study will illustrate that the ways of real world conflicts thus are adapted to cyberspace to 
attack the center of gravity in the opponent. This finding leads the conclusion that the cyber 
warriors seen in Syria is not a new phenomenon, simply the adaption of old strategies in a 
new domain. Lastly, the thesis operates under the assumption that the reach and effectiveness 
(measured in the level of attention and number of attacks) of the non-state actors depend on 
the level of organization and resources. These assumptions can be summarized in five points: 
(1) Non-state actors use cyberspace in conflicts;  (2) Subversion is the ultimate goal of their 
actions in cyberspace; (3) This is done by spreading a strategic narrative and build soft 
power; (4) To reach their goal, they use guerrilla tactics; (5) The effectiveness is determined 
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by level of organization and resources. This thesis will combine literature on soft power and 
subversion within the framework of conflict in cyberspace. It argues that cyberspace gives 
non-state actors a new domain to undermine the role of the state or the opposition, but that 
neither the nature of conflict or the nature of subversion enters a new paradigm. Strategic 
narratives are used in the hope of shaping the relative soft power like in traditional conflicts. 
Combining an element of surprise, rapid movement, and sabotage these actors rectify their 
weaknesses, and promote a particular strategic narrative to alter the relative soft power 
balance. We therefore see a potential trend of “soft war” moving into cyberspace. 
 
Some key developments form the framework of this thesis. Firstly, war has existed as long as 
humans have interacted in proximity3. However, how these are conducted has changed 
fundamentally over the course of history. Major wars like the American Civil War, the 
Russian Revolution, World War I and II, the Gulf War, and the War on Terror, are all 
milestones in the sense that they present key developments in how combatants organize and 
what technology is available (Diesen 2013). Since the end of the Cold War however, a 
growing percentile is intra-state conflicts. A key question has become why the weaker actors 
are able to defeat the stronger Goliath on so many occasions. One key conclusion is that non-
state actors win when they refuse to follow the same strategy as the stronger party (Arreguin-
Toft 2001)4. By defining and controlling the battleground, they are able to shape a strategy 
that plays to their strength, thus compensating for their weakness in numbers and 
sophistication.  
 
Secondly, cyberspace and Information and Communication Technology (ICT) have rapidly 
become an integrated part of our everyday life and during conflict. Though of dubious direct 
military strategic relevance, as it is unable to settle a military conflict by itself, the perceived 
power of this domain is well illustrated by how governments in Iran, Syria and China have 
blocked oppositions’ means of communication (Geiss 2013, 3). One interesting and new 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Today we see a wide range of conflict typologies; from low-intensity conflicts between groups in failed states 
like Somalia, through “traditional” civil wars seen in Syria, to internationalized conflicts like Afghanistan 
(Geiss 2013, 3) 
4 Arreguin-Toft’s paper on why the weak win wars (2001) is an interesting, inspirational paper for this thesis. 
His study concludes that the weaker actor can be able to defeat the stronger if the strong and the weak use 
different tactics. If the stronger actor exploits its greater might by focused on direct attacks, the weaker is 
therefore advised to focus its strategy on the indirect, guerrilla-/ insurgency tactics to be able to survive and 
possibly increase its reach. By consequence one can therefore hypothesize that weaker actors using cyberspace 
as a tactical fighting ground may be able to have an impact on public opinion if left alone by the stronger state-
actor. 
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perspective is Thomas Rid’s (2013) book “Cyberwar will not take place”. Rejecting the 
proposition that cyberspace fundamentally changes warfare and the potential of a “Cyber 
Pearl Harbor”, Rid argues that the importance of cyberspace in conflict is in the potential for 
subversion, espionage and sabotage. This perspective is consistent with this thesis. It argues 
that cyberspace gives non-state actors a new domain in which to undermine the role of the 
state, but that neither the nature of conflict or the nature of subversion enters a new paradigm. 
Cyberspace only facilitates a new form of subversion as the nature of cyberspace is low-
entry, allows the presence of many groups in conflict, and is global.  
 
Thirdly, in the major conflicts of the last decades, winning “the hearts and minds” is 
presented as a panacea for sustainable stability and peace (Dickinson 2009). If so, cyberspace 
is likely to play a dominant role as a primary medium and influential tool. Additionally 
cyberspace is perceived as the “weapon of the weak”, giving citizens a neutral medium to 
communicate among each other and to tell their stories to the world. Consequently the social-
media revolutions are described as “people revolutions”, linking massive online support to 
legitimate revolts. To what extent these beliefs that underpin for example the Arab Spring, 
are true is debated but online media holds potential for participants in a way impossible in 
traditional military domains5. The combination of perceived legitimacy and few obstacles to 
entry obviously makes alteration and manipulation of this domain attractive, much as 
propaganda and strategic communication in traditional media.  
 
Propaganda in the broadest sense is the technique of influencing human action by the 
manipulation of representations (Lasswell 1972, 214–222). 
 
In this thesis the data collection is done by combining a targeted literature search with a large 
collection of primary data on attacks completed during the Syrian conflict. One of the main 
contributions of this work is therefore an extensive empirical record of cyber attacks during 
the Syrian conflict. All attacks meeting the criteria6 have been included in the attempt to 
provide an as unbiased review as possible, though some limitations are discussed in the 
methodology chapter. The record of the primary data is presented in the appendix, and forms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 If accepting that cyberspace is a conflict domain one must also accept that it is lower entry barrier than say 
traditional warfare on land, sea or air due to the level of resources necessary. However, high impact cyber 
campaigns like Stuxnet does not have the same low barrier as the cyber operations evaluated here. This type 
demands massive resources, human capital and intelligence and is therefore beyond the scope of the groups 
evaluated here. Additionally there is the open-source nature, the potential for anonymity and global reach.  
6 Non-state actors of a certain level of organization and presenting a strategy over some time.  
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the basis for the evaluation done in the analysis. The findings of others are included when 
relevant to increase the legitimacy of the research. 
 
This thesis finds some support for all the assumptions, but naturally any soft element to 
conflict is complicated to measure during an ongoing conflict7. What is clear from the case 
study is that non-state actors use cyberspace extensively in the Syrian conflict. It is the most 
socially mediated conflict in history (Lynch, Freelon, and Aday 2014), and this domain still 
enjoys the perception as a channel for unmediated information. Manipulation and 
justifications are therefore key messages spread to undermine the adversary’s position in the 
real world conflict. Ultimately they seek to subvert each other, aided by strategic narratives to 
shape the relative soft power balance. However, as they operate in an online maze and lack 
resources necessary for direct conflict, the actors studied use what can be called cyber 
guerrilla tactics. One of the actors studied, the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA), is rather 
successful in hindering information diffusion, implement espionage software, and infiltrate 
opposition online communication networks. The other party to the conflict, the opposition, is 
found however to have a much shorter empirical record and gains less attention. This is in 
great extent explained by their organizational proficiency.  
 
Previous research is limited, and mostly focuses on the use of social media by citizens or 
cyber wars between states. This thesis however studies the use of hacking by non-state actors 
in an information warfare perspective. This thesis does not seek to develop any theory, only 
provide more insights into the Syrian groups. The key outcome is therefore an attempt to 
develop an analytical framework, and the collection of an extensive record of the attacks 
completed by the Syrian cyber warriors8. Hopefully, it will also indicate a course of research 
that can be adapted to other cases in future research. A sure academic footing is vital when 
undertaking a work such as this, but before the theoretical framework can be presented we 
need a clear understanding of technological aspects in the thesis and of the key terms. Then 
the foundation for the guiding assumptions and theoretical groundwork will be presented. A 
methodological chapter will then outline the choices made, the guidelines implemented for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 the Syrian case provides a new development in the role of non-state actors in cybered conflicts, it was deemed 
the appropriate case As. This is further discussed later on.  
8 The author has followed the groups from 2011 to 2014, and has recorded all the attacks reported in 
international media available at the time of writing. Though some shortcomings may exist, 106 attacks are 
recorded and analyzed. Additionally are attacks verified by other researchers but not included in the primary 
data due to the fact that the author has not seen primary proof of the attack. To my knowledge, this thesis 
therefore provides one of the most comprehensive records, especially in the case of the SEA.  
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the primary data collection, and the strengths and weaknesses of the research project. The 
case study of Syria will then follow, testing the assumptions against empirical findings. 
Lastly conclusion will be presented at the end of the work.  
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The basics of cyberpower: type of attacks 
and key terms 
 
Cyberpower is a new conception, and is recently incorporated into the growing literature on 
cyber warfare. Unfortunately, many understandings of key terms and academic assumptions 
thus exist. Additionally this thesis is written as a partial completion of a master program in 
political science, and readers may not be familiar with relevant nuances to technological 
concepts. This section outlines key terms and how possible attacks can come about. The 
description will be as non-technical as possible9.  
 
The basis of all cyber behavior is based in what networks enable; that two or more computers 
can communicate. This is the foundation for any of the attacks evaluated here, as the attacker 
uses his/ her computer to manipulate the victim’s to do its biddings. When two or more 
networks communicate, they create an “ant hill” of integrated information systems. They can 
be closed, which means that they exist within a defined area and is usually referred to as 
“Intranet”. These can be global but have a more limited reach as they do not link onto the 
global “cyber-highway” we call the Internet. Networks that are a part of this global 
infrastructure however are referred to as open. The cyber actors analyzed in this research are 
of rather low sophistication and have yet to attack a closed network, which is by nature 
harder to access. Therefore, this will not be evaluated.  
 
Non-state actors in cyberspace can refer to a number of actors, ranging from civil personnel 
working with infrastructure, criminals exploiting software weaknesses, hacktivists pushing a 
cause, to “cyber warriors”. Distinction is complicated and often blurred as jurisprudence is 
still immature, academic classification disputed, and actors often cross imaginary boundaries 
between the various “professions10”. The type of actors studied in this work must have a 
political agenda in the conflict, some sort of organization, be formally independent of any 
government, and have completed several attacks.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 As the analysis is of a political science nature, all technological aspects are also not necessary and can be 
accessed in the vast IT literature.   
10 For example: how to classify a youngster causing damage to a website due to weakness in Wordpress code for 
”fun”? Or hacktivist group Anonymous? Or differentiate between the recruitment process online for the 
mentioned groups and collectives vs. Terrorists?  
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When networks are interlinked and communicate, they create cyberspace. Though an 
everyday concept, it has various meanings depending on a materialistic (hardware), 
infrastructural (linkage), or effect based (software) focus. The fact that the environment is 
manmade further complicates the understanding and I have therefore included a brief 
definition:  
 
Cyberspace is a time-dependent set of interconnected information systems and the human 
users that interact with these systems (Ottis and Lorrents, 2010:267). It is the notional 
environment where digitalized information is stored or communicated over information 
systems or networks (Hunker 2010, 2).   
 
Cyber power therefore becomes:  
 
The ability to use cyberspace to create advantages and influence events in other operational 
environments and across the instruments of power. Cyber power can be used to produce 
preferred outcomes within cyberspace or it can use cyber instruments to produce preferred 
outcomes in other domains outside cyberspace. Information instruments can be used to pro-
duce soft power in cyber space through agenda framing, attraction or persuasion (Nye 2010, 
3–5).   
 
As we see, it can be further divided into soft and hard cyber power. While hard power rests 
on coercion and payment, soft power behavior relates to framing agendas, attraction or 
persuasion (Nye 2004 ch.1). Soft power, therefore, changes behavior by shaping preferences 
and what is deemed legitimate (Nye 2010, 8–9). Joseph Nye further divides cyber power into 
“three faces” and concurring actions11:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 David J. Betz and Tim Stevens have similarly classified four types of cyberpower (Langø 2013a, 28–29): a) 
compulsory, b) institutional, c) structural, and d) productive11. The most relevant for this thesis is productive 
power, defined as  “the constitution of social subjects through discourse mediated by and enacted in cyberspace, 
which therefore defines the ‘fields of possibility’ that constrain and facilitate social action”(referred in Langø 
2013a, 28–29).  
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Table 1: The three faces of cyberpower (Nye 2010, 7). 	  
1st Face: A induces B to do what B would initially otherwise not do  
 Hard Power:  Denial of service attacks, insertion of malware, SCADA 
disruptions12, arrests of bloggers.  
 Soft Power:  Information campaigns to change initial preferences of 
hackers, recruitment of members of terrorist 
organizations.  
2nd Face: Agenda control: A precludes B’s choice by exclusion of B’s strategies 
 Hard Power:  Firewalls, filters and pressure companies to exclude 
certain ideas and behaviors.  
 Soft Power:  ISPs13 and search engines self monitor, ICANN14 rules 
on domain names, widely accepted software standards.  
3rd face: A shapes B’s preferences so some strategies are never considered.  
 Hard Power:  Threaten to punish bloggers who release certain material.  
 Soft Power:  Information to create preferences (e.g. nationalistic 
patriot hackers), develop norms of revolution (e.g. child 
pornography).  
 
Cyber attacks of varying impact are completed to project cyber power. Repeated cyber 
attacks between two or more parties can thus be understood as the foundation of a cyber 
conflict. Cyber conflict is defined by CCSA research agenda (2005) as:    
 
The conduct of large scale, politically motivated conflict based on the use of offensive and 
defensive capabilities to disrupt digital systems, networks and infrastructures, including the 
use of cyber-based weapons or tools by non-state/transnational actors in conjunction with 
other forces for political ends. Broader then cyber warfare, cyber conflict includes all 
conflicts and coercions between nations and groups for strategic purpose utilizing cyber space 
where software, computers and networks are both means and targets (referred in Mulvenon 
and Rattray 2012b, x).  
 
Cyber attacks consist of identifying weaknesses in systems and inflicting damage by altering 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 A system operating with coded signals so as to provide control of remote equipment. May be combined with a 
data acquisition system by adding the use of coded signals to acquire information about the status of the remote 
equipment for display or for recording functions (Cyber Security Dictionary 2012).  
13 An Internet service provider (ISP) is a company that provides customers with Internet access (Janssen n.d.).  
14 The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) coordinates the Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority (IANA) functions, which are key technical services critical to the continued operations of 
the Internet's underlying address book, the Domain Name System (DNS) (ICANN n.d.) 
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how the system works, much like biological viruses (T Chen and J.M. Robert 2004, 1). The 
former relates to behavior like copying or removing data without permission, but without 
disrupting the original architecture of the system. Consequently an active attack refers to 
operations where systems are corrupted or disrupted, and service is affected or denied 
(Hunker 2010, 2). Computer Network Attack (CAN) is one sub-type and refers to either 
action undertaken to disrupt, degrade, deny or destroy information stored on computers or in 
networks, or manipulate and/ or take control over a computer or network15. This is the type of 
cyber attacks studied in this work16. It is also possible to distinguish based on purpose 
between information warfare, which targets diplomacy and propaganda, and cyberwar 
founded in military operations targeting IT infrastructure. One can therefore distinguish two 
categories of cyber attacks; those that affect the physical world (Geers 2011, 41) and those 
with a “softer side”; aimed at perception management, deception, or any form of 
psychological operations (Mulvenon and Rattray 2012a, xii). Though not an end itself, cyber 
attacks are means to a wide variety of strategies like propaganda, espionage, denial of 
services, and disruption of infrastructure (Geers 2011, 9).  
There are also multiple tools of cyberpower. Some, like Stuxnet17, are of high sophistication 
and requires vast resources and intelligence. Others can easily be done with free software 
found online. The tools used by the actors in this research lean towards the lower levels. 
Though a learning curve is expected, it is more likely that they will use the same type of 
attacks on victims of higher importance. Below is a brief introduction to the tools of cyber 
power most relevant to this thesis:  
• SQL injection18: More commonly known as hacking of computer systems, social 
media accounts or a website. SQL injection is a rather technical term but signifies that 
unauthorized actors access the backdoor functionality of for example web 
applications or user-supplied data. Unauthorized individuals thus change the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Targets can involve states, commercial enterprises or individuals (Sheldon 2013, 311). 
16 Electronic (where electro-magnetic pulses overload circuits) and physical attacks on infrastructure are 
excluded from this analysis. This is known as Computer Network Operations (CNO), which embodies CND 
(Computer Network Defense) CNA (Computer Network Attack) and CNE (Computer Network Exploitation). 
CNA refers to attacks where damage is caused within or with help from the system. CNE refers to espionage 
where information is taken without permission.  
17 Stuxnet was a computer worm discovered in 2010. To date it is the most sophisticated, and is believed to have 
targeted the Iranian nuclear program. It collected information and damaged centrifuges by increasing their 
speed. It consisted of a highly specialized malware and is believed developed by the US or Israel’s national 
security agencies.  
18 SQL is the abbreviation used for structured query language, but it is more common to just use the 
abbreviation.  
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architecture to fit their preferences. It subverts the original intent of the application by 
altering the statements controlling functionality. It can also be used to distribute 
malware to users of the application (Sammut and Schiffman 2014). 
• Denial of Service Attacks (DoS): a type of attack on a network seeks to overload its 
capacity with activity, and thus forcing the network to crash19. A large-scale version is 
Disruption and Denial of Services (DDoS) where multiple compromised systems, 
which are usually infected with a Trojan, are used to target a single system causing a 
Denial of Service (DoS) attack.  
• A Botnet (= “net of robots”) is a collection of network-linked programs that 
communicate with other programs to jointly solve a task. It is often done by 
machines20, and facilitates large-scale spamming of commercials or to facilitate 
DDoS. Certain software can link multiple computers together and thus strengthen the 
capacity of an attack; this is done by so-called “zombie computers21”.  
• Defacement can be understood as a form of cyber vandalism. It means that a hacker 
accesses a website and alters the information stored here, usually by SQL injection. 
Often they leave some type of signature, like a logo, to prove that they accessed the 
site much like graffiti in public places.  
• Surveillance systems like Remote Access Trojan (RAT). RATs are usually 
downloaded with a software update or email attachment (Rouse 2009). It gives 
administrative control, which allows the intruder to a) monitor user behavior through 
keyloggers (which steals passwords) or other spyware; b) access confidential 
information, such as credit card and social security numbers; c) activate a system's 
webcam and record video; d) take screenshots; e) distribute viruses and other 
malware; f) format drives; g) delete, download or alter files and file systems. When 
the system is compromised, RAT also facilitates spread of malware to for example 
establish a botnet (Rouse 2009). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 One way of thinking of this effect is to imagine a highway that suddenly experience unprecedented traffic, 
and extensive traffic jams develop. However in cyberspace, the non-physical element, this leads the highway to 
collapse much like a overloaded bridge.  
20 There are some records of this being done by individuals refreshing specific sites or forwarding emails in a 
coordinated manner. This may cause overload, but is relatively ineffective as it is highly labor intensive 
compared to an automated network of computers working together. Additionally the computers are able to 
operate faster, thus creating more traffic than humans are able to do, and therefore hold a higher potential for 
success.  
21 These referrers to compromised computers, which are controlled by hackers or other, unauthorized 
individuals.  
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• Software like VPNs and Proxy Servers obscure identity. Virtual Private Network 
(VPN) increases the reach of a private network by connecting it through public 
networks like the Internet. By creating a “tunnel” it enables computers to exchange 
data as if they were located within the same closed network. Proxy server is when one 
machine operates as an intermediary between two others. Using this type of software 
can therefore obscure location and identity. It may also be a way of bypassing 
firewalls or access restrictions 
 
After this clarification we will now move on to the next chapter of the thesis, outlining the 
theoretical basis of the research that underpins the described research question and key 
assumptions.   
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Theory and literature review  
 
There are several key assumptions underpinning this research project. They will be tested at 
length in the case study, but beforehand the analytical and theoretical framework must be 
presented and past research evaluated. Firstly we will evaluate the reality of cyber warfare as 
this debate creates the analytical backdrop of the thesis. It also explains much of the 
definitional confusion and why non-state actors are overlooked as a topic within this strain of 
research. It clarifies the evolution of the field and thus becomes a key component of a 
literature review. The second sub-chapter will take a closer look at what guerrilla tactics 
entail and how these can be translated into cyberspace. Thirdly, the role of the non-state actor 
in this domain will be outlined. Lastly, two sub-chapters will draft the relevance and meaning 
of narratives and soft power. It will demonstrate how informational and psychological 
warfare have kinetic, subversive effects and how these manifest in cyberspace. Together 
these sub-chapters form the base of the thesis.  
 
Is cyberwar coming?  
Academics have since the 1990s claimed that the integration of cyberspace into conflict has 
fundamentally changed how wars will be fought (Geers 2011, 9, 25). According to Mulvenon 
and Rattray:  
 
Cyberspace has altered politics, economics, social interaction, national security and provided 
new opportunities, capabilities, vulnerabilities and threats (2012a, vii).  
 
In 1993, cyberwar was declared imminent by Arquilla and Ronfeldt22, and became a common 
phrase in national security by the end of the millennium. Simultaneously our growing 
dependence on IT systems to provide basic services to the citizenry also led to concerns of 
cyber-terrorism. Security personnel feared being held hostage by rouge actors with 
unauthorized access to vital national infrastructure, and responded by establishing cyber 
armies and cyber militias23. Though of more recent date, these sentiments is well illustrated 
in a quote from Geers (2011, 105):    
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Arquilla, John, Ronfeldt, David F. and Rand Corporation.  (1992),  Cyberwar is coming! Santa Monica, 
California: RAND 
23 For example USA, Norway and Estonia now have integrated cyber units in their military.  
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A cyber attack is best understood not as an end in itself, but as an extraordinary means to 
accomplish almost any objective. Cyber propaganda can reach the entire world in seconds via 
online e news media. Cyber espionage can be used to steal even nuclear weapons technology. 
Moreover, a successful cyber attack on an electrical grid could bring down a myriad other 
infrastructures that have no other source of power.   
 
Over the last couple of years, the debate has somewhat shifted. Though still state-centric, 
some recent works conclude that the probability of a “Cyber Pearl Harbor” is grossly 
exaggerated (Langø 2013b, 5)24. In ”Cyberwar will not take place” (2013) Thomas Rid 
argues that cyberwar cannot become reality, as the domain is unable to cause violent effects. 
Eric Gartzke further argues that conflicts in cyberspace are unable to deter or compel the 
opponent in the physical world, and thus has little independent value (Langø 2013b, 21). It 
does not correspond with Clausewitz’ three criteria of war25, and can only be understood as 
sophisticated versions of traditional tactics like sabotage, espionage and subversion (Rid 
2013). Instead of changing war itself, it only adds another dimension to fight in.  
 
The empirical evidence supports this argument; cyber incidents tend to follow actual conflicts 
as the Chechen wars during the 1990s, the Kosovo war in 1999, the Middle East in 2000, 
Estonia in 2007, and Georgia in 2008 (Geers 2011, 80–86). The attacks have a broad specter 
of targets, and seek to impact whatever economic, informational or propaganda aspects of the 
conflict possible26. As the effects are at best uncontrollable and questionable, the costs of 
developing sophisticated cyber weapons are not worth the benefits. The framework of this 
thesis thus operates with a middle ground of cybered conflicts; where kinetic and virtual 
tactics interact to a common approach. Here low-level cyber attacks are used as a 
complementary strategy to the real conflict, but resembling traditional vandalism, 
propaganda, or sabotage. Therefore there are to date no cyber wars, in the sense that conflicts 
are not fought exclusively with cyber power. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Thomas Rid and David J. Lonsdale spearheads this perspective (Langø 2013a, 15), which also guides this 
thesis. 
25 Instrumental, political and violent (Rid 2013, 1) 
26 For example during the Georgian conflict (2008), Russian hackers targeted government websites in hope of 
hampering coordination between agencies and damage the citizenry’s faith in its government. The success of 
these attacks is debated due to complications in measure effects. Also in Estonia the same trend was reported. 
For example, Ruus concludes that  “the wave of attacks in Estonia, targeted the entire civil and economic 
infrastructure with the aim of paralyzing the society in a country, whose high reliance on computerized 
networks has given it the nickname “E-stonia” (Ruus 2008). To date there are no record of decisive military 
effects, though there are some claims that Israel was able to enter Syrian airspace undetected in 2007 due to a 
cyber intrusion.  
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What is a non-state actor in cyberspace?   
Unfortunately, there is not much previous research relating to the non-state actor in 
cyberspace as most focuses on the state behavior. However, there are several push factors 
explaining the entry of non-state actors in cyberspace, ranging from the architecture of the 
infrastructure to the social components of this domain27. Additionally, recent conflicts 
indicate that non-state actors’ reach and importance in this domain is only growing28.  
 
The Oxford Dictionary describes a non-state actor as “an individual or organization that has 
significant political influence but is not allied to any particular country or state” (2014). 
Academically, non-state actors can thus be defined as “an organized political actor not 
directly connected to the state but pursuing aims that affect vital state interests” (Pearlman 
and Cunningham 2012, 3). They can therefore include all  “non-governmental actors who are 
participants in conflict including terrorists, protest groups, criminal organizations, 
corporations, multi-stakeholder organizations, ad-hoc collaborative groups and individuals” 
(Mulvenon and Rattray 2012a, 88). Non-state actors in this thesis refer to the individuals 
operating outside the governmental establishment to reach a political goal. Thus their 
behaviors work in collaboration (of a certain formality) with their chosen political group. The 
group refers to either the established regime or its’ contenders29. If supporters of the regime, 
non-state actors refer to groupings working to maintain the regime’s authority despite not 
being part of the formal structure30. 
 
The involvement of civilians in recent cyber-conflicts has created a sizeable gray area 
between hacktivists, political hackers and legitimate combatants backed by nation-states. The 
debate has been fierce concerning if these people are individual and independent actors, 
motivated by political or nationalistic goals, or participants in covert government-orchestrated 
campaigns with the purpose to further the strategic political or military objective of the 
instigating state (Sigholm 2013, 22–23).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 As we will see, the low barrier to entry (at least for low level attacks and vandalism) allows more actors than 
in traditional domains of war. Also important to keep in mind is the global reach of the internet, again allowing 
more actors. Thirdly, unlike traditional domians, in cyberspace most of the infrastructure is privatley owned and 
operated. This allows for a new level of private expertise and insights than seen before.  
28 In both the conflicts in Estonia and Georgia, non-state actors lead the offense and defense in cyberspace (Ottis 
2010; Ruus 2008).  
29 In the case of Syria, there are multiple rebel groups and insurgent coalitions who cooperate to a changing 
degree. However, these insurgents are included in the described understanding as they are political actors whom 
challenge the regime by political and military means.  
30 Here I refer to police, military or militias. To exclude various non-governmental groups like humanitarian 
agencies, lobbying organizations and various NGOs, the non-state actors dealt with in this research project 
undergo their tasks with the purpose of either maintaining or overthrowing the current societal structure, and 
their operations are part of a greater military strategy. As the thesis do not study government agents, like the 
intelligence apparatus, individuals belonging to this group are also excluded. 
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Non-state actors will remain a crucial part of future conflicts, and it is likely that this 
transcends into cyberspace; Mulvenon and Rattray even describes them of special relevance 
vis-à-vis other actors (Mulvenon and Rattray 2012a, 85). There are several reasons for this, 
but the underpinning assumption is that certain variables push the entry of such actors into 
the cyber domain, where they may have greater effects than in the physical world. The main 
push factors are: a) there is a low cost of entry compared to the other domains of war, despite 
the high expertise necessary to yield military results; b) by consequence the number of actors 
is in theory indefinite; c) nothing is final in cyberspace and multiple spaces can exist 
simultaneously; and d) the time and space dimensions are smaller than in reality (Sheldon 
2013, 210); e) the barrier to entry in cyberspace is relatively low, at least if the goal is attacks 
of low sophistication; and f) geographical factors do not necessarily dictate the parameters of 
actions as all are equally distanced from each other and hard- and software compose the 
environment. The real distinction in power is therefore based in innovation and logic, not 
traditional strength (Geers 2011, 10).  Cyberspace’s anonymity also blurs the distinction 
between state and non-state actors31, and government and civilian targets (Mulvenon and 
Rattray 2012a, 91). Regardless, Dorothy Denning concludes that the presence of, and 
possible dominance of cyberspace by non-state actors is too simple an argument. She agrees 
that the basic elements like computers and developing malware is rather simplistic compared 
to traditional military infrastructure. But any cyber attack with a “punch” is not easily done, 
and may come with a higher costs and more dubious outcome than in traditional conflict 
(Langø 2013a, 22)32. It is consequently more likely that the weaker actors will use methods 
of low sophistication, without the purpose of yielding definite results as described in the sub-
chapter relating to guerrilla warfare.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 As discussed there are several types of software that enables hiding ones’ identity. Secondly there is no way 
of seeing if a person behind a screen is wearing a uniform. Thirdly, cyber actors are often only known by their 
screen names and can in theory be of any gender, race, age, religion and nationality.  
32 DDoS and web-defacement is low barrier, but it is questionable if the effects can be significant.   
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Guerrilla warfare as a strategy in conflict  
Any form of conflict between parties with diverging resources has an asymmetrical nature. 
An asymmetrical conflict strategy can be thus be defined as:  
 
Leveraging inferior tactical or operational strengths against the vulnerabilities of a superior 
opponent to achieve a disproportionate effect with the aim of undermining the opponent’s 
will in order to achieve the asymmetrical actor’s strategic objectives (McKenzie Jr. 2001, 75–
76).  
 
Guerrilla warfare is a form of asymmetrical strategy, where the weaker combatants exploit its 
advantages to make up for its shortcomings in brute size and force. By avoiding direct 
conflict while imposing great costs, the guerrilla warrior hopes to raise the opposition’s 
stakes to an unacceptable level. Guerrilla warfare strategy is the organization of a proportion 
of society for the purpose of imposing costs on an adversary using armed forces trained to 
avoid direct conflict (Arreguin-Toft 2001, 103). It primarily targets opposing armed forces 
and their resources. It’s goal is to destroy not the capacity, but the will of the attacker 
(Arreguin-Toft 2001, 103). By doing so, the warrior seeks to end the conflict on more 
favorable terms than its relative position indicates (Arreguin-Toft 2001, 103) 33. Thus they are 
complementary to regular forces, not decisive independently (Kalyanaraman 2003, 177). It is 
defined as:  
 
Guerrilla warfare is a form of warfare by which the strategically weaker side assumes the 
tactical offensive in selected forms, times, and places (Kalyanaraman 2003, 172).  
 
Usually including insurgents, the non-state actors can be either in conflict against, or 
collaborate with, states (Mulvenon and Rattray 2012a, 88). The defining characteristic, 
therefore, is that the actors function with different capabilities and relative power, and by 
consequence different rules and realities. The state will hold the greatest traditional resources, 
and the insurgents are forced to choose untraditional strategies to survive. By refusing to play 
the game of the stronger party, David may ultimately be able to defeat Goliath. Colonel 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Ivan Arreguin-Toft (2005) actually finds that non-state actors succeed to a surprising extent. However the key 
variable in determining the winner is, according to Arreguin-Toft’s study, if the two parties chose the same or 
different strategies. Similar approaches favor the stronger as this dominates its chosen battlefield, while different 
strategies allows the weaker party to elect a responses that favor their strengths and exploits the stronger party’s 
vulnerabilities (Arreguin-Toft 2001, 108). One element of Arreguin- Toft’s thesis is however less relevant this 
analysis. The thesis claims that the weaker party can be more barbaric than the stronger, and thus plays by other 
rules. As cyber conflicts to date have had no direct casualties, this part of Arreguin-Toft’s thesis cannot be 
empirically tested. Arreguin-Toft distinguishes between direct and indirect tactics. The former targets the 
capacities of the attacker, while the second targets the will. Use of the same strategy favors the strong actor, 
while opposite approaches favor the weak (Arreguin-Toft 2001, 105).  
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Wallace and Major Reeves provide us with an amusing illustration of how this results in two 
realities of conflict strategy:  
 
In a fight between a fly and a lion, the fly cannot deliver a knockout blow and the lion cannot 
fly. It is the same war for both camps in terms of space and time, yet there are two distinct 
types of warfare – the revolutionary and the counterrevolutionary (Wallace and Reeves 2013, 
2).  
  
As in the physical world, non-state actors use cyberspace’s terrain, mobility, and special 
tactics to “turn the tables” on the stronger actor. This form of behavior may allow the groups 
to overcome their relative weakness compared to state militaries, as traditionally seen in 
guerrilla, raiders and insurgents warfare (Mulvenon and Rattray 2012b, 89). Insurgents avoid 
direct confrontation with the counterinsurgents, using hit-and-run violence, and utilizing 
small irregular groups to secure preservation (Findley and Young 2007, 383). It distinguishes 
from conventional warfare by lacking a clear front-line and large-scale, set-piece battles. 
Modern guerrillas also tend to be intensely focused on propaganda, swaying public opinion 
and winning the battle of the narrative by wearing down the enemy (adapted from Boot 2013, 
xxvi, xxii). Taber illustrates the strategy of guerrilla warfare with an interesting image:  
 
The guerrilla fights the war of the flea. The flea bites, hops, and bites again, nimbly avoiding 
the foot that would crush him. He does not seek to kill his enemy at a blow, but to bleed him 
and feed on him, to plague him and bedevil him, to keep him from resting and to destroy his 
nerve and his morale (Stout 2009, 881).   
 
Logically this form of waging war is adaptable to cyberspace. By exploiting and 
manipulating the architecture of this man-made environment, the actors turn their weaknesses 
to strengths. As in the real world, it is impossible for the stronger party to defend 
“everywhere” at all times. Thus, the weaker party can use hit and run tactics to attack the 
weaker point, whatever that might be. As guerrilla warriors attack a wide range of targets, the 
cyber actors have a broad specter of marks and are not by geography34. In cyberspace, this 
would entail using simpler forms of attacks against the weakest points, like sabotage and 
vandalism of whatever of websites with lesser consideration to their strategic importance. In 
traditional conflict, guerrilla warriors depend on light weaponry as a part of a strategy of 
denial instead of a strategy of defeat35 (Kalyanaraman 2003, 173). This thesis argues that low 
sophistication attacks are the cybered version of this strategy, executed to attack the will of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Though some locations have better infrastructure. However, in this case the actors of both factions mostly 
operate outside of Syria and thus in the same geographical location.  
35 As discussed bellow, the weaker guerrilla warrior cannot defeat the stronger party and thus focus their effort 
on raising costs to an unacceptable level.  
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the opponent.  
 
The mentality of the non-state actors in cyberspace also resembles the of traditional guerrilla 
warriors. They use the element of surprise and terror to their advantage, making anyone a 
potential target. Secondly, anonymity is embedded in the structure of cyberspace. Following 
the doctrine of Mao Zedong, the cyber warriors are becoming “the fish in the water” and 
indistinguishable from civilians. By attacking from the shadows, they need not fear 
retaliation (Toor 2011). They use ambushes and sabotage instead of open confrontation. The 
cyber-guerrillas can see the state clearly; the state cannot see them (Mavhunga 2008). These 
“flee bites” seek to provoke harsh retaliation by the opposing party, creating sympathy and 
recruit new supporters. The cyber guerrilla, as in the real world, benefits from the fact that the 
state is less able to respond quickly and restricted by rules and regulations.  
 
Traditionally guerrilla warfare is used when non-state actors fight the state. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that both factions studied here are defined as weak. Thus the 
stronger party, making the conflict asymmetrical, is a result of them operating outside the 
state system while attacking more resourceful third parties36. Additionally there is a relative 
power balance between the two factions of the cyber conflict. Regardless, the definitions and 
tactics are applicable when the weaker (pro- and anti-regime actors) use the benefits offered 
by the domain (cyberspace) to take on the relatively stronger actor (the Syrian state and the 
international community). In sum, we see that the guerrilla model’s power relationship 
applies. Lastly, as in real world guerrilla warfare the goal is ultimately to weaken the enemy’s 
will and not inflict offensive loss. Asymmetric warfare is, therefore, understood as a strategy, 
a tactic, or a method of warfare and conflict37 (Grange 2000, 1), both in the real and the 
virtual world.  
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36. In this case study, this refers to international news organizations or foreign governments / individuals.  
37 Three prominent examples of asymmetric actions that counterbalanced established force are: the sturmtrupp 
assault tactics that broke the trench-line stalemate and three-dimensional warfare as a result of the airplane 
during World War I; the panzer blitzkrieg through France in World War II; and the Strategic Defense Initiative 
that helped end the nuclear arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The kind of asymmetric strategy 
and tactics seen in the Vietnam War were termed guerrilla warfare (Quote Grange, 2000:1).  
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The power of the perspective  
Modern wars are different from those of the past, as they relate to the breakdown of a state 
unlike the former state-building wars (Kaldor 2013, 3). The source of conflict is thus, to a 
growing extent, “identity factors” (Kaldor 2013, 3) where the combatants represent different 
factions of a society. Consequently the non-state actor is a key player in conflicts, which 
often take place within the state. The key actors are hard to identify as they participate due to 
a number of motivations38, tendencies and interests (Kaldor 2013, 12). Political in nature, 
these loose networks are connected through overreaching narratives, which build a common 
identity. A key component of these conflicts are, therefore, informational and psychological 
warfare. Asymmetrical strategies are used to build legitimacy and support to compensate for 
physical and relative weakness. Both new and traditional media are therefore exploited and 
manipulated to push the chosen cause, and Syria illustrate that cyberspace is becoming a 
favored domain for the weaker party in a conflict to “win the hearts and minds”.  
 
Any discussion relating to conflict has an embedded debate on “power”. Power is a 
multifaceted term, but the traditional meaning signifies that person A can make person B do 
something (s)he would otherwise not do. What qualifies as power will therefore always 
depend on the surroundings and context (Nye 2010, 1) but it can generally be understood as 
the “ability to influence the behavior of others to accomplish the outcomes one wants”(Nye 
2004, 5)39. Power was later reorganized into two groups; hard and soft power by Joseph Nye. 
Hard power behavior rests on coercion and payment, while soft power behavior rests on 
framing agendas, attraction or persuasion (Nye 2004 ch.1). Soft power thus describes how 
external persuasion can alter behavior, creating the same gains without resorting to force and 
threats (Nye 2010, 8). It revolves around framing and altering what is seen as important 
(agenda-setting) and, in its outmost extent; change another person’s preferences. Soft power 
therefore relates to what extent the influenced actor sees its own actions as legitimate (Nye 
2010, 8–9). If so, the agenda setting has resulted in a “soft power-hold”, imaginable both 
stronger and more enduring that any forced behavior.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Like ideology, religion, culture, zelotry or economic gains (Grange 2000, 2) 
39 From the 1950s to the 1970s nuances were established through the “three faces of power”; a) getting others to 
do what they would not otherwise do (e.g. Robert Dahl, 1950s); b) agenda setting, or framing issues in such a 
way that the issue of coercion never arose (e.g. Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, 1960s); and c) that ideas and 
beliefs also help shape others’ preferences, and one can also exercise power by determining others’ wants (e.g. 
Steven Lukes, 1970s) (all refered in Nye 2010).  
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To frame others to operate in a manner of your choice without coercion is obviously very 
attractive as it demands fewer resources and provides a great pool of beneficial assets. 
Strategically it also allows for long-term victories, sustainable long after the military 
confrontation is over as “the hearts and minds” are conquered. This is not a new idea. 
Clausewitz saw warfare as an extended duel to “comply the enemy to do our will” (Berger 
2013). Obviously this is also the goal of the non-state actors in cyberspace. Throughout the 
Art of War, Sun Tzu highlights the importance of information and perception (deception and 
surprise) as the foundation for all military strategies and tactics (Berger 2013). Mao, inspired 
by Sun Tzu, even developed a philosophy of the importance of guerrilla tactics and non-state 
actors principles of behavior. Here the key was to become “the fish in the sea”; where it 
impossible to differentiate between the population and the rebels. As cyber activities cannot 
determine conflicts independently, its lure becomes the reach and persuasion in winning the 
“people”, “the battle of the narrative” and ultimately “the soft war”. It shares many 
similarities with Bordieu’s “power to construct social reality” (O´Hagan 2013, 559). To quote 
Grange: “The infosphere has become a new battleground suited for asymmetric attack from 
across the globe”(Grange 2000, 3).   
 
We know there is a linked relationship between beliefs and feelings (cognition and attitude) 
and action (behavior), but we are yet unable to quantify the effects (Leuprecht et al. 2010, 
47). However, we see that narratives target the two former, and use the impression made here 
to push for a certain type of action. Narratives “channel ideology, express collective identity, 
provide reason for action and aid in interpreting others” (US Army Field Manual 3-24, 
Counterinsurgency, cited in Zalman 2010, 4). Building on past and present (perceived) 
grievances and in-/out-group mentality, the storyteller justifies a certain form of behavior and 
entices others to follow. Personal connections and loyalties are promoted, and the group 
becomes a source of protection and safety (Leuprecht et al. 2010, 48–49). A strategic 
narrative can thus be understood as “system of stories that share common themes, forms, 
events, and participants, and create expectations for how those elements can be assembled to 
satisfy a desire that is rooted on conflict”(Nissen 2013, 73). By targeting the attitudes and 
perceptions, the sender seeks to control the behavior of others. Casebeer and Russel claims 
that the undermining of the opposing narrative can in the end decide the level of support and 
thus have kinetic effects in traditional warfare (Bøe-Hansen 2010, 24). However this strategy 
requires the attention of the recipients, and media thus becomes a powerful channel for 
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presenting one’s narrative. 
 
People only know a little region of their social lives; their beliefs and loyalties lack deep 
traditions. They are vulnerable to rumors, news and trends. Media is therefore used to make 
sense of a confusing, obscure and shifting world (Gitlin 2003, 1).   
 
The relationship between media and politics is defined by the media’s potential to form social 
understandings of the world, attitudes towards others, and how we comprehend conflicts 
(O´Hagan 2013, 558). Media and information becomes a tool of mobilization and persuasion; 
where all parties tell their “strategic narrative40” to promote a certain political behavior 
(Nissen 2013, 73). Media, through the CNN effect, influences in three interlinked, but 
distinguished, ways: a) as a policy-agenda-setting agent; b) an impediment to the 
achievement of desired policy goals, and c) an accelerant to policy decision making (Bøe-
Hansen 2012, 145). Adding on the Al Jazeera effect41 we include social media as a power 
factor, much with the same modes of influence as the CNN factor. Media, information and 
propaganda42 is therefore key tactics to secure political say and position (Nissen 2013, 74). 
This process is called “the battle of the narratives”. It rests on the idea that new wars include 
battlefields in the physical, moral and cognitive dimension. By combining ethos (trust/ 
credibility), pathos (emotions) and logos (facts)43 (Casebeer and Russel 2005, 12), narratives 
create perception, which again found legitimacy and public support (Nissen 2013, 79–80). By 
writing the conflict narrative one can form the “why”; determining if one are a terrorist or 
freedom fighter, thief or Robin Hood, just or despotic. Both traditional and new media (like 
social media and websites) play a central role in this “battle of the narrative”. Here 
combatants can foster support and promote specific perceptions and behaviors. Increasingly 
non-state actors also engage in this behavior. Fighting for public support and legitimacy can 
be a matter of survival, by swaying political decision-making in both states and international 
organizations (Nissen 2013, 74).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 A strategic narrative has also been described as a “…system of stories that share common themes, forms, 
events, and participants, and create expectations for how those elements can be assembled to satisfy a desire that 
is rooted on conflict”(Quoted from Nissen 2013, 73) 
41 Defined as ”the suspension of traditional political connections that have brought identity and structure to 
global politics by the connectivity of new media, a rewiring of the world’s neutral system” (Bøe-Hansen, 
2012:145).  
42 Propaganda can be described as “a process of persuasion which utilizes any available means (media) to 
persuade people (target audiences) to think and/or behave in a manner desired by the source in order to benefit 
the interests of that source, either directly or indirectly” (Quote from Nissen 2013, 76). 
43 This Aristotelian model was first presented by Thomas Coakley in his paper on the Peruvian counterterrorism 
(Casebeer and Russel 2005, 12) 
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The softer version of war  
The ultimate goal of the non-state actors is to undermine the opposition to the extent that it 
can claim results it would be denied by strength alone. In this thesis, this strategy will be 
referred to as subversion. Subversion can be understood as a deliberate attempt to undermine 
the trustworthiness and legitimacy of the established ruler (Rid 2013, 116). The ultimate goal 
is to overthrow the authority, but subversions can also have a lesser goal. The greater focus is 
to undermine social bonds, beliefs and trust necessary to maintain any organized collective. 
Not necessarily violent, subversion has historically manifested as ridicule, sabotage and 
protests to erode the power and repressive potential of a perceived illegitimate leader44. 
Hence, violence is not a mandatory participating factor as subversion relates to the current 
trend of “fighting for hearts and minds”45(Rid 2013, 120). Soft war aims to alter the soft 
power balance, thus targets the relative influential power conflicting parties have on each 
other. When occurring in cyberspace, this form of behavior is quite similar to what Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt named “netwars” 46, but in this thesis the form of behavior relates to a 
conflictual form of behavior complementary to a real world conflict instead of the low 
intensity “kulturkampf 47 ” described by Arquilla and Ronfeldt(Langø 2013a, 13). An 
understanding of what soft wars in cyberspace entail can thus be described as:  
 
To disrupt, damage, or modify what a target population “knows” or thinks it knows about 
itself and the world around it. A netwar may focus on public or elite opinion, or both. It may 
include public diplomacy measures, propaganda and psychological campaigns, political and 
cultural subversion, deception of or interference with local media, infiltration of computer 
networks and databases, and efforts to promote a dissident or opposition movements across 
computer networks (Langø 2013a, 13). 
 
When discussing soft power, the weapons are tactics of propaganda and “selling the best 
story”. “Soft cyberwar” is understood as the exploitation of the power and reach of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 As seen during occupations, in repressive regimes, and by political opponents, who all aim to paint the other 
as incompetent etc.   
45 Insurgencies and revolutions are thus only the most dramatic forms of subversion (Rid 2013, 120) 
46 Arquilla and Ronfeldt define netwars as: Netwar refers to information-related conflict at a grand level 
between nations or societies. It means trying to disrupt or damage what a target population knows or thinks it 
knows about itself and the world around it. A netwar may focus on public or elite opinion, or both. It may 
involve diplomacy, propaganda and psychological campaigns, political and cultural subversion, deception of or 
interference with local media, infiltration of computer networks and databases, and efforts to promote dissident 
or opposition movements across computer networks”(Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1995).  
47 The authors described netwars as: ”distinct from cyberwar by being “normally about low-intensity conflict 
(LIC) and operations other than war (OOTW—a broader concept than LIC that includes peacekeeping and 
humanitarian relief operations). Given both its form (asymmetrical, non-hierarchical, and probably non-violent) 
and function (societal change), netwar can be seen as a hypothetical continuation of traditional Kulturkampf” 
(Langø 2013a, 13) 
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Internet (Geers 2011, 95) causing confrontation as part of a larger “battle of narratives”. The 
founding belief is that new wars are not limited to the physical dimension, but also in the 
cognitive and moral spheres (Nissen 2013, 79–80). The approach places the population in the 
center, primarily fighting the opposition for the peoples’ “hearts and minds” (Findley and 
Young 2007, 378). Beyond an audience, insurgents require the population for supplies and 
protection. The people therefore become the “center of gravity”, described by Mao as “the 
fish and the water” (Findley and Young 2007, 383). They depend on the support of the 
civilian population, which must be secured by either their fear or their love. Soft wars thus 
target the population (“the sea”) directly, and aim to build a supportive environment for the 
goals of a movement. Influencing perceptions can in turn affect the outcome 48 . By 
consequence the generation, management and potential manipulation of information is a 
source of power, again fitting nicely into the framework of “the battle of narratives” and 
psychological warfare. As the case study will reflect, the non-state actors discussed also take 
aggressive means of subversion to use; manipulation and hacking to strengthen the position 
of their perception of the conflict. As the social reality constructs how we understand 
ourselves, and others, shaping it may determine conflict (O´Hagan 2013, 561). In sum, 
narratives can fundamentally alter how we organize our mental understanding of the world 
(Casebeer and Russel 2005, 6). According to Sir Rupert Smith, new wars are characterized by 
the fact that “information, not firepower, is the currency of the new wars amongst the 
people”(Bøe-Hansen 2012, 145).  
 
Information warfare consists of three pillars: a) attracting attention; b) raising emotions and 
feelings; and c) offering solutions to the crisis (Maliukevičius 2006, 137). Information 
warfare can, therefore, be understood as altering the context in which an agent receives 
information, either by manipulation of the actual information or its flow, by group pressure, 
or by propaganda (Bradsbury 2013, 15). Using information as a weapon therefore entails 
eliminating, distorting or stealing information for the purpose of obtaining necessary data 
after penetrating the security system (Applegate 2011, 19); blocking of access to information 
by its legitimate users (Applegate 2011, 19); information collection, storage, and 
dissemination can be compromised (Hutchinson and Warren 2001, 1); and lastly change the 
context to alter the interpretation of data (Hutchinson and Warren 2001, 1). Selective 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Hezbollah’s actions in 2006 (vs. Israel) demonstrate the disruptive effect of well-executed information 
warfare. The militant group was outclassed in terms of military warfare, but used information warfare and 
political will to influence its outcome (quote Bradsbury 2013, 16).   
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information is presented, only referring to favorable facts. Additionally psychological 
pressure is added by painting a sense of urgency, hence disabling additional information 
gathering or rational reflection (Maliukevičius 2006, 138). It targets emotions and impulses 
to form behavior, not rationality. Consequently the sender attempts to shape the recipients’ 
perceptions. It aims to create dissonance and disturbance in the public space, thus 
overshadowing alternative communications. Propaganda and information operations49 also 
seeks to direct action by either agitate or pacify the recipient, or immunize them to alternative 
narratives (Bøe-Hansen 2010, 15). 
 
The basic tenets of information warfare are no different now than they were 100 years ago. 
The use of propaganda and the ‘spinning’ of messages are and always have been powerful 
weapons (Bradsbury 2013).  
 
A clear understanding of what it entails is “a process of persuasion which utilizes any 
available means (media) to persuade people (target audiences) to think and/or behave in a 
manner desired by the source in order to benefit the interests of that source, either directly or 
indirectly” (Nissen 2013, 76). It can further be divided into “white” communication where 
the message is truthful and the sender is disclosed, “black” communication where the sender 
is fake/ unknown and the message seeks to deceit the recipient, and “gray” which reflects the 
middle ground between the two (Bøe-Hansen 2010, 15). All are founded in the four rules of 
thumb for mobilization during conflict situations; a) present a threat, b) report abuse and 
attacks, c) present the opposition as inhumane or unwilling to negotiate, and d) leave only 
military action as a viable option50 (Nissen 2013, 76). Nissen describes the competing 
narratives’ similarities as:  
 
Overarching narrative of their respective legitimate right to either uphold law and order 
against foreign-supported criminal groups or the rebels’ right to defend themselves against an 
oppressive regime, they both produce and project stories and events that support these stories 
containing the elements of the continued threat (..) of the inhumane behavior of the other 
party (2013, 77). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 In NATO, information operations provide advice and coordination of military information to relevant parties. 
It has five key areas of operation: Psychological operations (PSYOPS), military misdirection, operational 
security, electronic warfare and network operations (Bøe-Hansen 2010, 18).  
50 All these trends are seen today in Syria, especially in social media. 
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Figure 1: The tactics of information warfare (from Hutchinson and Warren 2001, 2) 
 
Information, due to the spread of information and communication technology (ICT), is more 
important than ever. Though highlighted as early as Sun Tzu Art of War, it has diversified 
and increased since the 1990s (Cavelty 2013, 363). Uncertainty also forms a large part of 
Clausewitz’s “Fog of War” (Lewis 2010, 4). Cyber attacks introduce a new dimension in the 
ability to create uncertainty and confusion among the opposition. This in turn slows decision-
making, increases caution, and increase the probability of error. Cyber intrusions can thus 
degrade morale and the will to resist (Lewis 2010, 5), showing similarities to traditional 
guerrilla warfare in the physical world. It also becomes a way to humiliate the adversary and 
disrupt the opponent’s conflict strategy. Cyberspace, due to the reach and low barrier of 
entry, also creates a new reality for the manipulation of information and presenting 
competing narratives. As seen in traditional conflicts, parties will use several mediums to 
present their version of events to the public. As computers, smart phones and the Internet 
become more available, the number of agents increases. Anyone may be a journalist, and in a 
conflict situation verification is complicated. So the separation between white, gray and black 
propaganda becomes harder. The Internet acts as a “force multiplier” (Goodman, Kirk, and 
Kirk 2007), facilitating large audiences and effects without the demand of more attackers. It 
provides a global forum in which actors can disseminate their propaganda. Additionally the 
scale of the domain makes any statement harder to refute. It has also become a mouthpiece to 
present threats, victories and accusations. These are often redistributed by the media and thus 
multiplying the audience and effects. As the technology behind this domain is little known, 
cyber fears may have unwarranted consequences and attention51.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 As seen by the described cyberwar debate and the fears of a few, non-state individuals’ ability to cripple a 
nations’ infrastructure.   
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Methodology  
 
The following chapter will outline the methodological choices made in this thesis and explain 
how the conclusions came about. This work utilizes the case study method, a well-known 
tool in political science, and therefore will not evaluate this unless relevant for the actual 
work undertaken here. It will instead focus on the strengths and weaknesses in this research 
project.  
 
There are some methodological challenges in this project, mostly relating to the fact that little 
previous research is done. Firstly, most literature relates to inter-state conflict, while this 
work researches the combating non-state actors in an intra-state setting. Secondly, several 
methodological challenges plague the current cyber conflict literature: great disagreement 
relating to key terms and definitions; strong wording relating to the potential consequences 
and reach of cyber activities with malicious intent52; and a strict division between the 
literature focused on the technological issues and the strategic issues53 (Mulvenon and 
Rattray 2012a, x). As a result, the thesis must balance various understandings, “languages” 
and methodological tools. Thirdly, the thesis combines insights from different fields like 
political science, political psychology, conflict studies, technological studies and media 
studies.  
 
Research question and key assumptions  
Any research project is founded in a specific topic and corresponding research question. As 
seen in the previous chapter, this thesis focuses on why and how non-state actors use 
cyberspace as a part of their strategy in a conflict situation. The research question becomes: 
“Why and how do non-state actors use cyberspace in modern conflict?“ 
 
To answer this question, certain assumptions are made. These are specific sub-questions that 
together build a train of arguments. This allows us to test the assumptions underpinning our 
research question. Firstly, non-state actors use cyberspace as part of their conflict strategy. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Here I am referring to the writings of for example Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1993), or Lewis (2010),  
53 Intuitively this is unfortunate as it is unnatural to evaluate technical components without the necessary 
technical understanding, and limiting to only evaluate the technological security element without inclusion of 
the wider consequences. Thus both camps are diminished by the lack of cross-field cooperation.  
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Secondly, this thesis is founded in the belief that they use this domain not only as a 
mouthpiece but also as a strategic tool of subversion aimed at undermining their opponent. 
These “warriors” actively sabotage, persecute, and spy on each other and perceived 
supporters by hacking accounts, defacing websites and manipulating social media outlets. 
Pushing an agenda of subversion, it is a different and more conflictual form of cyber-
interaction then analyzed before. They use this domain in conflict situations to exploit the 
potential for waging soft wars; a form of conflict participation where agendas and narratives 
compete. The third assumption is that they promote a strategic narrative and soft power 
through guerrilla tactics. The ways of real world conflicts are adapted to cyberspace, where 
the softer side of warfare seeks to damage the center of gravity in the opponent. This leads 
the conclusion that the “cyber warriors” seen in Syria is not a new phenomenon, simply the 
adaption of old strategies in a new domain. Lastly, the thesis operates under the assumption 
that the reach and effectiveness (measured in the level of attention and number of attacks) of 
the non-state actors depend on the level of organization and resources. These assumptions 
can be summarized in five points: (1) Non-state actors use cyberspace in conflicts;  (2) 
Subversion is the ultimate goal of their actions in cyberspace; (3) This is done by spreading a 
strategic narrative and build soft power; (4) To reach their goal, they use guerrilla tactics; (5) 
The effectiveness is determined by level of organization and resources.	   The case study 
method is perfectly suited as it will give us deep insights to the subject and “are more useful 
for generating new hypothesizes, all other things being equal” (Gerring 2007, 38).	  
 
The case study  
Gerring describes a case study as “a spatially determined phenomenon observed at a single 
point in time or over some period of time” and “the intensive study of a single case where the 
purpose of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases” (2007, 19–
20)54. King, Keohane, & Verba (1994) exemplifies; ” a uniquely bounded phenomenon in a 
historical or geographical sense, such as the case of Munich, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, or the Watts riots ” (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999, 372). We therefore see that a 
case study can be understood as the scrutiny of a certain object, not naturally distinguished 
from the surrounding process. Generalization is not the main desire, compared to statistical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Ringdal  (2007, 149) describes a case as “one or more units of analysis that are objects of scrutiny54”. George 
and Bennett adds that it is “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test 
historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events” (2004, 5)54, thus including time and the 
potential of generalization. 
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studies where the intention is finding the average effect on a wide range of cases. The case at 
hand is the non-state actors who operate in cyberspace as part of a conflict strategy in Syria 
between 2011 and April 2014.  
 
The Syrian conflict itself and the analysis of cyberspace as a warfare domain are 
unproblematic as several excellent inquiries exits (see for example Carr 2011; or Rid 2013). 
In this thesis, the case study is the Syrian conflict’s cybered aspects. As the Syrian Electronic 
Army, the most significant actor, was established in the fall of 2011 (SEA 2014) this is seen 
as an appropriate starting point of the research. The thesis is submitted in May 2014; thus the 
research must end at an appropriate time before this date. The end of primary data collection 
is therefore set to 01.04.2014. Though rather short time, this is deemed fitting both 
considering the scope of the thesis and the circumstances. Though the case study is Syria, 
certain limitations have also been done. Due to space considerations and available data, the 
actors researched are limited to the organized parties with enough attacks to reflect a strategy. 
Therefore individual actors responsible for single attacks are not included. In sum, the main 
object of research is therefore the pro-regime cyber units (exemplified by the Syrian 
Electronic Army) and anti-regime groups. The research object can be understood as “Syrian 
combatant non-state actors in cyberspace”55. As the anti-Assad opposition is not organized 
enough in cyberspace, it has not been possible to limit the research to two opposing “cyber-
guerillas”. The firmest conclusions are related to the actions of SEA, as the majority of the 
empirical data relates to this group. 
 
This thesis will explore both a new phenomenon (cyber warfare) in a traditional framework 
(intra-state conflict), and evaluate if old tactics (information and psychological guerrilla 
warfare) can be beneficial in cyberspace as well. The inspirational fields are well 
documented, though few similar research projects are undertaken. The case study is therefore 
understood as a hypothesis generating case study (Levy 2008; Lijphart 1971). There are two 
reasons for this: a) the aim of this research is closer acquaintance with a new phenomenon, 
and b) the empirical record is little and conclusions relating to a broad specter of events are 
therefore neither possible nor the goal. By combining insights from the several academic 
fields with primary data collection, this thesis can generate new insights into this ongoing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Either cyber militias with clear links to governments or military actors in a inter-state context. Some similar 
studies on European groups have been conducted by Rain Ottis at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre 
of Excellence (NATO CCD COE) and by Scott Applegate for the US Army. Their work inspires and somewhat 
guides the primary data collection, though they both focus most of their work on state actors.  
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conflict. However, as little similar work can be used to measure the reliability, conclusions 
must be seen as indicative rather than conclusive. 
 
Primary and secondary data collection 
Case studies are excellent for exploring why something happened and how it came about, as 
it gives insight into motivations and events to an extent lost on the more quantitative 
methods. Due to the closeness to the data, the research method can examine new causal 
explanations, mechanisms, parameters and variables (Collier, 1999, in Levy 2008, 5)56. It 
also simplifies the inclusion of context and a deeper understanding (Bennet 2004, 34–37; 
Moses and Knutsen 2007, 54). The case study gives an advantage of insights to elements 
unfit for existing theories by questioning hypothesizes, parameters and established truths 
(Levy 2008, 5). It is therefore a method for generating new knowledge (Eisenhardt 1989, 85–
86). Only by using the cause study can the nuances be captured, and the individual 
differences studied to the necessary degree.  
 
Case studies emphasis the contextual reality, and favor deep knowledge. However this may 
cost the width of the research project if favor of depth (Soy 1997).  
 
The data collection is a combination of targeted literature search and a large collection of 
primary data on attacks completed during the Syrian conflict57. One of the main contributions 
of this work is therefore an extensive empirical record of cyber attacks during the Syrian 
conflict58. All attacks meeting the criteria59 are included in the attempt to provide as unbiased 
review as possible. This is presented in the appendix, and forms the basis for the evaluation 
done in the analysis though the findings of others are included to increase the legitimacy of 
the research. The primary data for this thesis will to a great extent depend on what can be 
labeled “contemporary sources”; it has not been submitted to peer review and are for example 
blogs, twitter feeds, YouTube videos and Facebook statuses. The trustworthiness of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 “Given their close proximity to and familiarity with the data, case study analysts are well positioned to 
suggest additional explanatory and contextual variables, causal mechanisms, interaction effects, and scope 
conditions” 
57 Case study data can be collected from historical sources, registered data, interviews, fieldwork and surveys 
(Ringdal 2007, 150). 
58 Though the majority of the available data is related to SEA, but the works of international actors in 
collaboration with the opposition will be included. As the opposition lacks a specific cyber-army similar to 
SEA, ignoring the works of Anonymous and #OpSyria would therefore limit the research to SEA as an 
organized actor and some short-term groups of opposition individuals.  
59 Non-state actors, of a certain level of organization, presenting a strategy over time.  
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sources therefore can and should be questioned60. However, any individual hack is given little 
authority if not confirmed by the victim or another credible source. Any claim of hacks is 
only given credence if verified by secondary, independent sources like media articles or seen 
by the author herself. Attacks that are not confirmed by several source or peer-reviewed by 
fellow academics are excluded to secure the quality of the research. The thesis therefore 
depends on a strict criterion of verification and restrictive interpretation, which possibly 
limits the amount of data collected61. There has also been a comprehensive literature review 
to complement primary data and conclusions. Peer reviewed journals are used for the 
theoretical foundation and the empirical records62, as reflected in the bibliography.  Reports 
from reputable institutions are also used as collaboration of attacks to the extent possible.  
 
There are challenges relating to categorization. Awareness of the gray area between hacking 
(defacement, alterations of platforms and websites, use of code) versus social media 
exploitation63 is therefore necessary. These challenges additionally relate to the clandestine 
nature of the research object. Though the groups in question often boast of their actions, their 
links and dependence on formal organizations are kept secret. There are insecurities relating 
to the independence of the groups, their sizes, and ownership of hacks. In the primary data 
collection this challenge is redeemed by restrictive classification, based on the type of attack. 
The relative importance of an attack is based in the importance of the victim, as it is expected 
that a news agency have a greater security apparatus then civilians. The former victim thus 
requires more resources and expertise to successful hack. Another issue concerning primary 
data collection is the bias caused by the dependence on western sources. The Syrian 
Electronic Army has made a name for itself in certain milieus due to its attacks on several 
international news agencies. No other Syrian cyber militias are discussed at that level in 
either mainstream media or academic journals. The author reads Norwegian, English, 
Spanish and some French but is not competent in Arabic. Unfortunately that means that the 
relevant sources in this language are excluded. As social media updates by some groups are 
only written in Arabic, these groups have surely not attracted the deserved attention. It is 
likely that the Syrian opposition has higher representation in this group than the pro-regime 
attacks as the SEA publishes in both Arabic and English. However, all secondary sources 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 For example, it is easy for an individual to manipulate pictures proving a hack of a website 
61 This research also seeks to interpret the trends of the hacks, not independent events. 
62 Academic reports evaluating cybered events in Syria as well as news reports are consequently given more 
credence than self-reported attacks or events only referred in blogs etc. 
63 When a profile is stolen by traditional social engineering, not spyware, and used for impersonations  online.  
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support the view that the opposition lacks the necessary organization, expertise and authority 
in cyberspace. Translated material is also included when relevant and verified, both from 
social media and other researchers.  
 
Strengths and weaknesses  
Bennett (2004, 39–43) and Gerring (2007) identifies certain trade-offs when choosing case 
study as a research tool: a) Case selection bias (choosing the research object based on the 
dependent variable) vs. Confirmation bias, b) difficulties identifying the dominant cause, c) 
potential for generalizing results, d) risk of non-independent cases64 (Bennet 2004, 39–43). In 
sum the case study is overall a better method when a) data is descriptive instead of causal, b) 
deep insights are prioritized over the broader scope, c) internal validity is prioritized over 
external, d) the research seeks insight to causal mechanisms, d) the research is exploratory, e) 
there are few potential cases (Gerring 2004, 352).  As seen in Table 2, these trade-offs 
correspond greatly with the research goal of this thesis.  
 
Table 2: Trade-offs case study vs. statistical analysis (Gerring 2007, 38) 	  
 Case study Statistic analysis  
Research goal Hypothesis generating Hypothesis testing  
Prioritized validity type  Internal validity External validity 
Causal insight  Mechanisms  Effects   
Empirical focus  Deep  Broad 
Population   Heterogenic  Homogeneous   
Source material  “Thick”, diverse data “Thin”, standardized data 
 
Any research project is evaluated by its methodological quality; in which the key components 
are construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. The level of internal 
validity describes to what extent the causal path is correctly identified (Cook and Cambell 
1979).The case study enjoys a strong internal validity due to the deep insights and closeness 
to the data, which is true in this case as well. The author has followed these groups for over a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Galton’s problem: ”correlations between social institutions might not only arise under pressure of functional 
exigencies (that is, through processes operating within societies), but also as an effect of cultural diffusion 
between societies (Scott and Marshall, 2012). 
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year, and studied their doings in detail over a limited period of time. Construct validity entails 
that the correct measurements have been used to study the concepts, while external validity 
describes to what extent the results can be transferred beyond the immediate case(s). Both 
these validities are of lesser importance in this work, as it does not exist any established 
measurements due to the newness of the phenomenon. Secondly it does not seek to transfer 
the results, only to understand the research object and possibly develop a formula for further 
exploration of non-state actors in cyberspace. The external validity is therefore less relevant 
for this case as the thesis hopes to explore a sub-field rather then generalize across a number 
of empirical cases. It is also rather short empirical record of conflicts that include the cybered 
element, and they greatly vary to what extent65. As the advantages of the case study method 
in general and the goal of this case study strongly correspond, the case study method is 
deemed the most appropriate for this study. As seen in the Table 2 Trade-offs Case study vs. 
Statistic analysis, the gains by far outweighs the flaws.  
 
The reliability describes the accuracy of the study, and by consequence if it can be replicated 
(Soy 1997). This is always complicated with case studies as they include a wide range of 
variables and context. The same is true in this case, but the appendix provides a detailed 
description of all the attacks included in the analysis, thus facilitating replication. Lastly, 
causality may be complicated in the social sciences as few phenomena have a clear construct. 
This is defined by Gerring as ”the core, or minimal, definition of causation held implicitly 
within the social sciences is that a cause raises the probability of an event occurring.” (2005, 
167). This is obviously complicated in this case study as it is almost impossible to isolate 
events and determine if Y follows X. However, as this case study does not look at effects, 
causality is of less relevance. The case study is more applicable to the research into the causal 
mechanism (what causes what) than the causal effects (Gerring 2007, 53–56), as is the target 
of this investigation. This work has the purpose to establishing that something happens, not in 
what order. Regardless, it is important to remember that this may lessen the generalizability 
of the work (Gerring 2007, 44), as they deep insights into a specific phenomenon lessens the 
potential for broad conclusions applicable to a wide number of cases.  
 
The aim of the method is to understand “the greater picture”. However, this causes a lack of 
control and possibility for replication. The number of variables is rather great, especially 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Examples are the Middle East conflict, Hezbollah operations against Israel, Georgia –Russia conflict, and 
Estonia- Russia. All these conflicts had some cybered aspects, but great differences in execution and goals.  
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when exploring a single case. Regardless this is not seen as a great shortcoming as this 
research does not seek to develop a grand theory. This project only seeks to explore a 
potential framework for evaluating a new phenomenon in a specific context, possibly 
indicating a new use of old insights. The generalizability and replication are thus of lesser 
importance, as the research is hypothesis generating. However, if findings are to be 
transferred to other similar cases, the mentioned methodological challenges must be 
addressed. In this research, the case is chosen due to the wish to explore the present 
dependent variable, and thus random sampling has never been an issue (Bennet 2004, 19–20).  
 
In sum, Syria is not an easy case to evaluate. Firstly the conflict is ongoing and thus much of 
the data is contemporary, disputed, and influenced by the chaotic situation in ongoing civil 
war. Though important to keep in mind when evaluating the conclusions of this thesis, Syria 
is also an important case much due to the same reasons. The Syrian case is somewhat unique 
as it is related to the Arab Spring, but show many different traits in its horrors, length and 
lack of unified opposition. It is also the first cyber conflict of its kind. Though some events 
mirror the same tendencies (especially Estonia 2007 and Georgia 200866), this is the first 
internationalized cyber conflict where both parties involve non-state actors in an organized 
manner resembling a “cyber guerilla”67. Also, both parties are organized in cyberspace and 
are accused of using this domain as a battlefield for psychological and information warfare. 
We see tendencies to strategies where both traditional and social media are used in a 
coordinated manner to intimidate enemies, legitimize own actions, and sell narratives. 
Additionally hackers are playing a vital role in this battle, thus going beyond the scope of 
“Facebook revolutions 68 ”.  Lastly, it is also the first where an “international force” 
(Telecomix and Anonymous’ #OpSyria) has assisted local cyber-actors in a coordinated, 
global effort. To fully understand the role of the non-state actors in cybered conflicts, Syria is 
the natural choice.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 In these cases non-state actors were highly involved in the electronic elements of the conflict, especially by 
Russian sympathizers. There are several analyzes of these conflicts, especially by the NATO Cooperative Cyber 
Defense Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE).  
67 Representatives from both sides of the conflict has explicitly mentioned cyberspace as part of the conflict 
strategy, while both Estonian and Georgian conflict was dominated by individual citizens falling clearly within 
the category of ”patriot hackers” as discussed later on.  
68 Here private citizens use social media to inform and coordinate action, but hacking skills are not used to 
manipulate, alter, influence or prevent behavior.  
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The Syrian question: the how and the why  
 
In Syria, there are three non-state actor parties to the cybered conflict. Firstly, there are the 
regime supporters, represented by the Syrian Electronic Army. This group has to date 
reflected the highest level of organization and sophistication. Secondly there are the anti-
regime groups, which operate as a loose collective linked with various rebel groups. Lastly, 
there is the international element, reflected in the involvement of global hacker communities 
like Anonymous and Telecomix. In this thesis, the international element will only be included 
when they aid anti-regime groups, and these are therefore analyzed together. 
 
The case study, and Shehabat (2012), finds that both sides of the conflict pursue strategies of 
cybered information and psychological warfare.  Aided by social media and cyber attacks, 
they spread their narrative, monitor each other, and undertake disinformation campaigns by 
means of propaganda and hacking. The Syrian conflict is also unique as it is the first where 
cyberspace is used extensively by both sides of the conflict (Shehabat 2012), and both go to 
extraordinary lengths to sabotage, disrupt and destroy the other (Salhani 2013).  
 
This case study consists of several sections. First the technological situation in Syria will be 
outlined to facilitate understanding of the environment in which the actors operate. Secondly, 
the main actors are introduced. Thirdly, an overview of the trends in Syrian cyber attacks 
between 2011-2014 is provided, divided into three sub sections. Then a discussion on the 
assumptions and findings is presented in the sub-chapter “the Syrian cyber battle”. Before the 
final remarks, we conclude by taking a closer look at to what extent the cybered aspect of the 
Syrian cyber conflict qualify as a soft war.  The course of the conflict will not be described 
unless it is relevant to the technological aspects of the conflict, as several excellent overviews 
already exits69 and this work operates under space limitations. 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 For a brief introduction, see for example overviews produced by The Huffington Post 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/johncurran/syria-explained_b_4059238.html or the BBC 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868.  
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Syria and cyberspace  
Before acquainting ourselves with the main actors in the Syrian cyber conflict, we need to 
describe the state of Syrian cyberspace as this provides the framework for the actors to 
operate within.  
 
Looking back, we can identify some key steps in the development of technology and media 
in Syria. The development of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) can be 
argued to correspond with the power of the Assad regime, which has a long tradition for 
information manipulation. Starting with the 1963 coup d’état, the media became a tool of 
government propaganda and control (Baiazy 2012, 1), and media freedom degraded rapidly. 
The state controlled newspapers, books, radio and television broadcasts, and advertising. 
After 1974, the Syrian media's main task was additionally to promote the personal cult of 
President Hafez al-Assad (Baiazy 2012, 1), and critique of the president or the ruling elite is 
to date forbidden. However, from the 1990s the Arab world experienced a media revolution 
as satellite television and the Internet was introduced to the region. For a time the possibility 
of state control was limited, and a vibrant social media environment emerged. As new 
technology was introduced, new voices were heard and challenged the informational 
hegemony of the regime. A process of opening started, but Syria is a long way from a 
technologically developed society with free media. Despite rapid growth in infrastructure and 
use, there is still a low level of penetration, lack of human capital and little ICT expertise 
(Khamis 2013, 1). Lastly, the current phase started in 2011. A media reform package was 
tailored to meet the demands of protesters, when decree 108/2011 defined the media as free 
and independent. However freedom is still limited by the constitution and national security 
considerations70. The decree also prohibits any information that “weakens national unity” or 
“harms state’s symbols”. In reality this wordings can be interpreted to entail a wide range of 
information, and media freedom is at best established on paper (Baiazy 2012, 1–2).  
 
Telecommunications in Syria is highly regulated, and infrastructure is owned by the state 
through the state-owned Syrian Telecommunication Establishment (STE). The Syrian 
Informatics Society, with the president patrons, monopolizes the Internet and supervise all 
private Internet Service Providers (ISP) (Baiazy 2012, 15). The government dominates the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Including any content harming religion, initiating crimes, violence, terrorism, hatred and racism, and any 
news relating to the armed forces (Baiazy 2012, 1–2).  
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market, creating one of the most controlled in the region. The regime and supportive 
businessmen have controlled the media infrastructure for decades, thus silencing opposition 
and securing international legitimacy (Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn 2012). Monopolies are 
protected to control public opinion, and great investments are made in sophisticated cyber 
surveillance (Baiazy 2012, 15). Lastly, the Syrian conflict has seen several disruptions of 
cellular and Internet communications71 (Bradsbury 2013, 14) to prevent citizen journalism 
and communications between rebel fighters (Freedom House 2013). However, the regime is 
cleverly sensitive to not enrage the unaligned population by long-term blackouts as in Egypt 
and Tunisia. SEA also blames the insurgents whenever ICT malfunction, thus sharing the 
blame and challenging the narrative of the regime as oppressive. The case study indicate that 
the Syrian regime and its supporters studied the Arab Spring, and make sure to avoid making 
the same mistakes as the now toppled regimes in neighboring countries.  
 
Simultaneously as control of cyberspace is growing, Syria, as well as much of the Middle 
East, has experienced a massive surge in both infrastructure and users over the last decades. 
Syrians online has grown from 30 000 to 5 million (Reporters without Borders 2013) in just 
ten years72, and social media has exploded73. Regardless, it still influences only a limited 
percentile of the Syrian people (Baiazy 2012, 12; CIA Factbook n.d.) consisting of almost 18 
million individuals (CIA Factbook n.d.). In comparison, there are 12.9  million (2012)  
mobile phones in the country74. Facebook, Twitter, Skype and Yahoo Messenger all 
broadcasted news and information, both genuine and manipulated. To prevent the reach of 
these devices, the Assad regime even banned IPhones at one point (Shehabat 2012). Today 
the Assad regime has also increased online surveillance and blocked Internet access on 
various occasion. However satellite telephones, international SIM card and proxy modems 
limits the effectiveness of the limitations.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 For example in August 2012, services were cut in the second largest city, Aleppo. Less than two weeks earlier 
the whole of Syria was disconnected from the Internet for 40 minutes (Bradsbury 2013, 17) 
72 2000 to 2010 
73 ”From December 2008 to March 2011, the number of Twitter users in the Middle East and North Africa 
exploded, from 1,335 to nearly 1.2 million. While the UAE leads the region in numbers and user activity, 
activity is growing fastest in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan” (Quote from Baiazy 2012, 11) 
74 By far surpassing the use of fixed telephone lines with 4.425 million (2012) users (CIA Factbook n.d.).  
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Figure 2: Fixed broadband subscription per 100 inhabitants, Syria (International 
Telecommunication Union 2014) 
 
From 2000 to 2012 internet users in Syria grew from 0.2% of the population to 22.5%, but 
still only 35% of households (2010) have internet access (International Telecommunication 
Union 2013). Now security officials require picture ID and registration at Internet cafés, to 
prevent acts by “destabilizing elements”(Baiazy 2012, 14). In February 2011, social media 
sites like Facebook, YouTube and Twitter was again available in Syria after three years 
blockade (Baiazy 2012). Today about 10 000 people join Facebook in Syria every month 
(Baiazy 2012, 5), making it one of the most important channels for news, information and 
interaction with others. The reopening happened after a Syrian Revolution page appeared on 
Facebook and events escalated in Tunisia and Egypt. However, activists claim that it was 
done only to facilitate surveillance, and push rebels to abandon anti-detection software 
(Baiazy 2012, 18). Since the start of the revolts in 2011, the regime has also several times 
closed media offices, limited internet access and prevented journalists’ investigations (Baiazy 
2012, 7).  
 
Reporters without Borders categorize the media system in Syria as authoritarian (2013), 
where the regime’s needs for legitimacy and stability dictate communication development. 
Freedom House concurs and scores Syria 85 point on a scale where 100 represent total 
government control online (Freedom House 2013). The media is controlled by financing, 
licensing and legal means. It in turn protects the regime and circulates the policies of the 
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government. The revolts have decentralized the media, though censorship is broad and harsh 
punishments common. Bloggers and users of social media still risk intimidation, arrest and 
torture (Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn 2012). Some reports even indicate that activists are 
beaten until they reveal their social media login credentials. Regime agents then use stolen 
profiles to spread information under false persona. Information found is also used as proof of 
anti-establishment behavior (Deibert 2013). People, therefore, share passwords with trusted 
friends so these can delete any incriminating online critiques if they disappear (Preston 
2011). In all, the level of surveillance and fear of harsh punishments pacify the citizenry. 
According to Freedom House,  
 
In an environment of extreme violence and arbitrary “red lines,” self-censorship is 
widespread. Most Syrian users are careful not only to avoid such sensitive topics when 
writing online, but also to avoid visiting blocked websites (Freedom House 2013). 
 
Together this makes Syria is one of the least developed markets in the Middle East, with a 
long tradition of blocking foreign websites and censorship. The combination of low levels of 
human capital and development, but massive surge in users, resembles the rest of the Middle 
East affected by the Arab Spring. However, as the case study will show, the actors in Syria 
face a different reality than seen in Tunisia and Egypt. But before exploring the responses to 
their cyber environment, we must acquaint ourselves with the main players.  
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The main players  
The following section is divided into two parts, one for the each of the parties in the Syrian 
conflict75. It will outline who they are, and how they are organized. After this introduction, 
the thesis will move on to the main part of the case study, which evaluates what actions the 
players have undertaken.  
  
The pro-regime faction: The Syrian Electronic Army    
The most referenced actor is by far the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA), which emerged in 
2011. SEA declare on their 2014 website (SEA.sy) that they are independent citizens, who 
formed the organization in response to:  
 
The Arab media and Western media’s bias in favor of terrorist groups that have killed 
civilians and the Syrian Arab Army, and destroyed private and public property (SEA 2014)  
 
They go on to describe their vision as:  
 
We hope the experience of the Syrian Electronic Army to become taught in the future for the 
people who refuse to kneel to the West and that our experience becomes an approach for the 
coming generations to walk in our footsteps. We are a peaceful resistance because we want 
only to carry the weapon of knowledge (SEA 2014).   
 
Their vision and purpose have remained steadfast over the course of the conflict. However, 
this study shows that the group has evolved over the last couple of years. Perlroth (2013) 
finds the same tendencies, and concludes that different individuals make up the SEA today 
then in the beginning. In 2011, there was a clearly defined hierarchy with a leadership 
structure, media representatives, technical experts76 and volunteers (Perlroth 2013). The 
group also started in 2011 what can be understood as a virtual academy, called “The Syrian 
Hacker School” to recruit and train sympathizers in the use of DoS, computer infiltration and 
electronic surveillance (Noman 2011a, 13). Today though, the group most likely consist of 
members categorized as civilians with technical training or professional hackers (Fisher and 
Keller 2011). Resembling Anonymous, a loose networking structure is lead by a dozen 
members known under aliases like “the Shadow” and “Th3Pr0”. The SEA spokesman, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 As stated before, international actors will only be evaluated together with domestic cyber actors. This limits 
the number of parties from three to two, though the international element is still included in the analysis.  
76 Most likely from the Syrian Computer Society.  
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Th3Pr0, regardless claims that the group consists of thousands of members (Assir 2013) who 
function on a volunteer basis. But there are some indications that the groups is now reverting 
back to a firmer organization, as the new website indicate at least attempts to coordinate and 
define leadership structures.  
 
The relationship between SEA and the Assad-regime is disputed for several reasons. For one, 
reports indicate that the group passes on opposition’s identity and location to the Syrian 
security forces. Also, the group is able to operate without any known interference from the 
regime, signaling at least tactical support (Noman 2011a). Additionally the original SEA 
website domain (Syrian-es.com) was registered to the Syrian Computer Society on May 5th 
2011, an organization founded by Bassel al-Assad77 and later headed by President Bashar al-
Assad (Fisher and Keller 2011). President Assad’s cousin Rami Makhlouf also supposedly 
pay members between $500-1000 per month, and provide training in both Syria and Dubai 
with support from Russia (Harding and Arthur 2013). Lastly, President Assad also referenced 
the group in a 2011 speech, stating that:  
 
The army consists of the brothers of every Syrian citizen, and the army always stands for 
honor and dignity. Young people have an important role to play at this stage, because they 
have proven themselves to be an active power. There is the electronic army which has been a 
real army in virtual reality (Quoted in Fisher and Keller 2011). 
 
SEA, however, vigorously refutes any claims of sponsorship, but voice strong support of 
Assad and his regime. Their spokesperson,“Th3Pr0”, stated in an interview 30.04.2013 that 
“If the President lose then Syrian and the Syrian people will lose, but Syria will not lose... the 
right never lose” (Stalinsky and Sosnow 2013). In sum, it is uncertain whether the SEA is 
contracted, integrated or simply likeminded to the regime. It is regardless clear that both the 
SEA and the regime benefit form the current ambiguity as the regime cannot be held 
accountable for SEA’s actions, for example when the group attacks foreign media websites. 
The regime run less risk of other countries waging high sophistication cyber attacks as long 
as the proxy relationship remains. SEA also profits as it may operate with tactical support, 
but without constraints. It is therefore likely that the current marriage will continue.  
 
According to the group, SEA’s work is built around three axes: Facebook, Twitter and cyber 
attacks (SEA 2014). It is therefore impossible to ignore their social media strategy, though 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Bassel al-Assad was the eldest son of former president Hafez al-Assad, and was intended for the presidency 
before he died in a car accident in 1994. His brother Bashar al-Assad therefore succeeded their father as 
president of Syria in 2000.  
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this is not the main focus of this thesis unless it relates to unauthorized use, access or other 
forms of hacks. SEA profiles on sites like Facebook, Twitter78, YouTube, Instagram, 
GooglePlus and Pinterest present “proof” of the rebels as foreign agents, vandals and refute 
any dwindling support for the government.  These sites are therefore targeted by domestic 
and international opposition forces, and have been deleted repeatedly due to violations of the 
services’ Terms of Use agreements. These sites are regardless quite popular, the latest 
Facebook page had for example 4686 likes after only five days . Several reports indicate that 79
social media also is used to spread spyware, build narrative, and as a medium for information 
warfare. Their own statements also support the analytic format of this thesis, as the SEA 
describes their reasoning for hacks as follows:  
 
(….) due to the lack of ways to deliver a picture of events for what they are in Syria and the bias 
of the media coverage of the Syrian opposition, which the whole fabricated and unbalanced, we 
may have a number of times to break through news sites worldwide to put the news of our 
country as they are and explain to our young people, Syrian believer, and do not deny many of the 
times that we hacked e-mails and pages for individuals, institutions and media organizations and 
the opposition of hostile policy of the Syrian Arab republic and we post them to the public to 
understand the world the size of the plot hatched against our country from the financing, arming 
and publishing false news (SEA 2014). 
 
We now have a clear understanding of the pro-regime fraction, represented by the SEA, and 
move onto the opposition’s less organized approach.  The groups’ actions are described in 
detail later.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Both their Facebook page and Twitter account has been deleted repeatedly, SEA claims 239 and 15 times 
respectively (SEA 2014). 
79 Unlike its former Facebook pages where posts was made in both English and Arabic, and the current website, 
this Facebook page only posts in Arabic. See the 292nd Facebook page at: https://www.facebook.com/SEA.292. 
The current was established April 4th 2014, and it is possible that SEA now only posts in Arabic to avoid 
detection by Facebook administrators that have shut down former sites. However, the SEA twitter account 
continuously links to the Facebook page to entice followers in both platforms.  
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The anti-regime faction  
The anti- regime fractions focus their work on promoting the rebellious narrative, support 
moral of fighters, and discredit the regime (Shehabat 2012). The opposition has been 
operative in cyberspace since the start of the uprising (SECDEV Foundation 2013a), and in 
the beginning was clearly the winner in cyberspace. Today though, the opposition functions 
as a loose collective, lacking the force of a unified group. The groups vary in size and 
professionalism, but generally target government websites or computers. This research also 
indicates that rebel operations are either a single attack by one or few individuals (and 
therefore excluded from the empirical material), smaller groups with a limited number of 
attacks, or operations in cooperation with international actors. The empirical record also 
reflects the lack of a comprehensive strategy between the many groups, and lack of 
coordination. This will be further discussed later on.  
 
Some of the main anti-regime actors in Syria, with some duration, are according to the 
SECDEV Foundation (2013a, 4):  
• The Chinese Army for Crushing Syrian Regime Shabiha: created in September 2011, 
this group removes Facebook and YouTube channels of pro-regime groups. It has 
been quite successful in spamming social sites, and also uses mass reporting of 
violations to Terms and Conditions relating to hate speech and incitement to violence 
to force the sites to close certain pages or channels. It is the most persistent of the 
anti-regime hacker groups, and is based in Syria.  
• Hackers of the Syrian Revolution: this group focuses their attacks on regime computer 
infrastructure. It appears to consist of only four individuals, but has successfully 
hacked computers at the Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources, the Syrian General 
Security Department (GSD) and the state-owned Syrian Virtual University in 2013. 
The published internal memos from the GSD, including the names of 700 people 
sought by the regime. By help of social media platforms, the hackers also seek to 
expose and discredit individuals.   
• Jabhat Al Nusra Electronic Army: the groups Facebook page has existed since the 
summer of 2013, and claims that the hackers are affiliated with the extremist militants 
of Jabhat Al Nusra80. There are some indications that the group operates out of Abu 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 This is yet to be independently confirmed (SECDEV Foundation 2013a, 4) 
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Dhabi and Damascus, and condemn Shiite religious orientation. To date the group has 
defaced the website of Addounia TV, a pro- Assad satellite channel, and claim to 
have gain access to computers and social profiles of pro-regime individuals. It also 
targets members of the pro-regime Shiite militia Abu Al Fadl Al Abbas, People’s 
Committees, and the National Defense Forces.  
 
SECDEV81 finds that these are the main anti-regime actors, but the empirical record collected 
for this thesis does not reflect the same importance and their influence is therefore not 
evaluated as especially strong. As seen in the record of this thesis, the attacks by the anti-
regime faction are rather dispersed, and few groups have completed multiple attacks.  
Syria has a high level of mobile phone penetration, facilitating wide broadcast of videos 
(Shehabat 2012). Portraying the regime’s actions, the Syrian Free Army has also established 
press offices called “Local Coordination Committees” (LCC) and Facebook groups which 
allows communication domestically and internationally (Shehabat 2012). They circumvent 
limitations by accessing servers in neighboring Turkey and Jordan, to avoid regime 
surveillance and detection (Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn 2012, 13). However, this is only 
possible in border towns, where networks have been established to collect firsthand 
testimonials of regime brutality within Syria (Shehabat 2012). Individuals located across the 
border then spread the news globally82. The most important channels for the opposition are 
Facebook and YouTube (SECDEV Foundation 2013a); mimicking protesters instead of the 
cyber force at least the pro-regime aspire to become. This is also probably why the SEA has 
targeted these sites with malware and spyware, ultimately giving associations to the self-
censorship imposed in Orwell’s novel “1984” and Gestapo’s Germany.  
 
Compared to the SEA, the Syrian opposition lacks a united organization with the same level 
of sophistication and holistic strategy as the SEA. There are several minor groups that seem 
unable to launch larger campaigns together. As in the real world, the opposition is hampered 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 The Foundation is a Canadian-based, not-for-profit organization, whose work has been supported by the 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Freedom House, The Open Societies Foundation, the 
Global Peace and Security Fund (DFATD), the US Department of State’s Bureau for Democracy, Rights and 
Labor, and the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies. They have partnerships and projects 
in Latin America, the Middle East, the CIS, Sub-Saharan Africa, South East Asia, Western Europe and the 
United States. They are privy to information, resources and a time frame not available for this thesis- and their 
findings are therefore included though the empirical material does not reflect the claimed position.  
82 Obviously fact checks and journalistic integrity is then next to impossible, making manipulation easier though 
multiple sources are officially required (Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn 2012, 20). 
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by the multiple fractions and its’ inability to cooperate. The regime’s high capacity in 
surveillance, censorship and disruption of Internet access also complicates the establishment 
of a professionalized force within Syria. The pro-regime activists use Remote Administration 
Tools (RATs), phishing, DDoS attacks, defacement and malware to hamper the work of the 
rebels. Of low sophistication, these tools resemble low-level espionage and sabotage. 
However, it is a disturbance, and the surveillance capabilities may prevent supporters joining 
the cause.  Less funded and coordinated, the anti-regime groups are also more vulnerable. 
Again this mirrors the realities of the physical conflict. The hostile environment limits the 
effectiveness of anti-regime hackers, the construction of a wide reaching narrative, and 
complicates the unification of cyber campaigns. Undependable electricity and Internet access 
hamper anti-regime hackers’ efforts, human capital is lost as a consequence of the physical 
conflict, and the deterioration of the physical conflict has led supporters to focus their 
resources on military or humanitarian aid (Sumey 2013). 
 
Therefore the cyber opposition has sought support abroad, both from hacker communities 
like Anonymous or Telecomix, and Islamist groups like Ahrar al Sham Technical Office and 
Jabhat Al Nusra Electronic Army (SECDEV Foundation 2013a, 3–4). These networks are 
international hacker communities with a flat organizational structure where individuals join 
for specific causes. Short-term they may have some impact and gain attention, but their loose 
organization and broad scope of attention damages the potential for continuity. Thus, cyber 
power of the opposition has fluctuated greatly during the Syrian conflict, mostly dependent 
on the amount of support from abroad. With help, the opposition has successfully completed 
several phishing campaigns and RAT operations to gain control of targeted computers. 
Typically, these belong to the Syrian government, pro-regime individuals or social media 
sites of pro-regime groups (SECDEV Foundation 2013a, 3–4).  
 
In 2012 Anonymous declared its support to the rebellion and some subversive results were 
achieved. In November 2012 the alliance was reaffirmed as Anonymous declared war on 
Assad after he threatened Internet blackout in Syria (Bennett-Smith 2012). The group also 
launched the global effort #OpSyria83. However, few records of attacks are confirmed for this 
research, despite grand claims by Anonymous. But some attacks received widespread 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Anonomous stated that the operation had a twofold goal: ”One: gather any and all media coming OUT of 
Syria and spread the info. And two: OFFENSIVE, we are going to take down EVERY Embassy in the world 
Assad has left, begining with his biggest and most powerful supporter nations."(Phelan 2012).  
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attention, especially Anonymous’ breach of SEA’s servers leading to the publication of 
members’ identities and passwords (Boone 2013). The Syrian Free Army (SFA), in 
cooperation with Anonymous, also has had some success disrupting and embarrassing Assad 
and his followers by publishing private correspondence. The strategic effect is questionable, 
though the signal effect may be consequential as it damages the Assad cult developed over 
the last decades. According to the Washington based research project CSPRI, USA has also 
provided the anti-regime forces with some training in encryption, circumvention of firewalls, 
and securing communication (Sumey 2013). Additionally the New America Foundation 
provided the rebels with devices that will secure Internet access regardless of regime-
implemented blackouts (Sumey 2013). Some defensive aids have been developed, like 
“panic-apps” that delete all information or present false screens on smartphones (Sumey 
2013), but in comparison to the SEA the anti-regime forces are outnumbered and out-
resourced.  These international campaigns have some impact within Syria, but their domestic 
nature force less international attention and lower propaganda effects.  
As we see, the two factions in Syria wage an information war in cyberspace. There are many 
organizational similarities, but the SEA is currently the stronger party. They enjoy a higher 
level of coordination and resources, and are able to complete a higher number of attacks both 
domestically and internationally. The opposition in cyberspace suffers many of the same 
shortcomings of the real world. Currently, the anti-regime hackers are loosing the Syrian 
cyber conflict. We will now move to descriptive analysis of the trends in the attacks during 
the course of the conflict, divided into three sub-chapter based on the findings of the case 
study.  
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Trends in Syrian cyber attacks 2011-2014  
The following section will explain the main trends in the Syrian cyber attacks. This is divided 
into three sub-groups based on type of attack. It will also outline some main events, and 
discuss to what level an increase in sophistication has occurred since 2011.  
 
As seen in the empirical record (see also the appendix), there are certain trends in the Syrian 
cyber attacks. We see that low sophistication attacks like DDoS, defacements and social 
media account hijacking is the most common courses of action for both factions. To date the 
SEA has a) hacked, disrupted, defaced and closed anti-regime websites both in Syria and 
abroad; b) spammed anti-regime social media with pro-regime statements; c) launched 
propaganda campaigns under Facebook aliases; and d) uploaded videos to YouTube to 
discredit the opposition (Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn 2014, 425). The anti-regime faction of 
the conflict also use YouTube, but not as part of a hacking strategy. Their actions tend to 
focus on government affiliates and supporters, and are mostly consisting of defacement, 
DDoS and data dumps. Additionally, the type of targets and attackers differ between the 
groups but include foreign governments, other hacktivists, or global news outlets. However, 
all the victims have in common that they are perceived as allies of the opposing party. The 
target selection is therefore based on perceptions, not facts. The data collected demonstrates 
that SEA has a much longer record of attacks than the opposition. This is probably due to two 
factors:  a) the anti-regime group is less effective as they operate with a fractioned structure 
and fewer resources, and b) the attacks completed by the anti-regime are less likely to gain 
attention in international media as they mostly attack the regime, though some supporters 
have experienced DDoS and account hijacking. Consequently the attacks are mostly reported 
in Arabic, and are less likely to be part of the empirical record of this thesis due to the factors 
discussed in the methodological chapter. The international profile is also probably off less 
importance to the anti-regime faction as they already hold the support of the international 
community, whereas the SEA states that they desire to counter the current international 
coverage of the Syrian conflict.  
 
Khamis, Gold and Vaughn (2014, 420) find a distinction between the regime’s more 
traditional top-down approach to propaganda, which is balanced out by the cyber activities of 
its supportive non-state actors, and the bottom-up approach utilized by the opposition. It is 
therefore a central point that the pro-regime strategy enjoys the strongpoints of each 
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approach. The SEA contribution allows the broader approach founded in social media and 
disinformation campaigns. However, the leniency and possibly support of the regime allows 
for organizational strength and necessary resources. This case study also identifies two trends 
in the pro-regime narrative: a) the regime as the defender against imperial forces (exemplified 
by figure 3 and 5); or b) the regime as the strong, caring and brave father of all Syrians 
(exemplified by figure 4).  
 
 
	  
Figure 3: The leaders. From SEA twitter account 19.02.13 	  
 
 
 
Figure 4: "Call on me Syria, my dear mother!" Picture from SEA website 
(http://www.sea.sy/images_gallery/en).  
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Figure 5: Syria vs. the rest. From SEA twitter account 29.08.2013 
(https://twitter.com/Official_SEA16/media)  
 
However, it has not been able to demonstrate an equally clear narrative in the opposition’s 
operations due to the lack of empirical data. It appears at best more diversified, but a 
common message is that the regime is abusive, illegitimate and weakened. Both online and 
offline media is used to promote the narratives in the Syrian conflict, both depending on 
stories of torture, abuse and criminal activity (Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn 2014, 426). Both 
attempt to build perceptions of “martyrs”, “criminals against the people”, “victorious 
supporters”. Assad additionally employ perceptions of historical injustices by claiming that 
the opposition is supported and financed by Western states and Israel, and maintain the 
argumentation of territorial integrity (Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn 2014, 429). Both sides use 
cyberspace to sell one’s narrative, recruit new members and maintain existing support 
(Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn 2014, 431). This corresponds with the presented theory.  
 
The empirical record and primary data collection show clear trends in type of cyber attacks, 
and significant difference between the two fractions. As presented in figure 3 and 4, the SEA 
has a more diverse and holistic strategy with distinct attacks in all three categories. The 
primary data concerning the anti-regime opposition however demonstrate a focus in the 
second category “data dumps, DDoS and defacements”. As figure 9 demonstrates later, the 
opposition especially utilizes data dumps. This may indicate a defensive strategy rather then 
SEA’s offensive. However, it may also indicate that the opposition focus on revealing human 
rights abuses and violence at the hands of the regime, thus attempting to subvert legitimacy 
as ruler. If the second interpretation is true, then SEA’s work must be focused on hindering 
the spread of subversive information. Most likely, the strategies are a combination of the two. 
As further discussed bellow, the relative power is quite asymmetrical which probably leaves 
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the opposition to focus its resources on the potentially most beneficial course of action. 
SEA’s resources and organization allows an offensive campaign to hinder diffusion of the 
subversive message.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Pro-regime attacks in primary data by category 	  
 
 
 
Figure 7: Anti-regime activity in primary data by category 
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It is also clear from the primary data and the studies referenced that the hacker communities 
Telecomix and Anonymous represent the greatest embarrassment to the regime, similarly to 
how SEA dominates the pro-regime fraction. This may to some extent damage legitimacy of 
as the Assad regime strongly push a narrative of the rebellion as foreign enemies of the 
Syrian state with imperialistic motivations. Though clearly not imperial forces, the 
international hacking communities dominance may create a perception of a weak and 
foreign-controlled opposition. However, this may also be of some advantage as it gives a 
perception of global support to the rebels. The alliance’s consequences for the narrative and 
soft power are therefore unknown at the present time.  
 
The case study will now take a closer look at the primary data and outline what type of action 
is undertaken. There are three sub-sections following the categorization of figure 6 and 7.  
 
Social media  
The empirical record in the primary data shows that social media infiltration is one of SEA’s 
main courses of action. The opposition, however, seems to have focused their low 
sophistication attacks on website defacements and leaking information84. Consequently this 
section will focus on the work of the SEA. We see that especially Twitter accounts and 
Facebook profiles are vulnerable to account hijacking, but blogs and YouTube85 also fall 
victim to attacks. Social media can be manipulated using specific software that is easily 
accessible, and this type of attack is therefore classified as of low sophistication.	   
 
In the beginning, in June 2011, SEA started a campaign to compromise and infiltrate 
opposition Facebook pages. They replaced anti-regime logos with SEA posts and pictures, 
claiming “bragging rights” for the intrusion. The number of fans of pages drops significantly 
after such infiltrations though the original title and structure remained (Noman 2011a). There 
are even accusations of individuals tortured until they disclose passwords for social media 
and emails (see also Baiazy 2012, 20), indicating the importance of this medium in the 
conflict. Intrusion of social media profiles has remained a key tactics in the conflict as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 This corresponds with the track records of Anonymous in other cyber operations. Past operations tend to 
focus on Social Engineering (where individuals are psychologically manipulated to give access to systems or 
reveal log-in credentials), defacements, DDoS, or SQL injections and data-dumps (of private documents, emails 
etc.).  
85 It is true that the Syrian conflict has been called the ”YouTube Revolution” and that this medium plays a key 
role, but it’s importance stems from the number of videos posted and not their alteration and manipulation. 
Therefore this is not within the scope of this thesis, as it does not constitute as hacks.  
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SEA seeks to control the information available. While the websites suffer unauthorized 
alterations of content, the Facebook pages experience repetitive comments on multiple posts 
during a limited time to spread a specific message and dominate any dialogue occurring in 
the social media forum.  The European Parliament, the European Union, the White House, 
the U.S. Department of State, U.S. President Barack Obama, French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy, Oprah Winfrey, Human Rights Watch, the al-Jazeera TV channel, al-Arabia TV 
channel, and religious scholar Sheikh Yusuf Al Qaradawi have since then all experienced 
these types of attacks by SEA. Additionally the SEA has hacked several major news and 
human rights organizations like BBC, CBS, AP, Reuters, Human Rights Watch; either 
leaving a signature logo or posting messages disguised as authentic news. The most dramatic 
event occurred on April 23rd 2013 when a fake AP twitter post read “Breaking: Two 
explosions in the White House and Barack Obama is injured”. The Dow Jones fell 
immediately by 150 points and $136 billion was lost in market equity (National Post Wire 
Services 2013; Stalinsky and Sosnow 2013). However, when White House officials refuted 
this message, the stock market quickly recovered.   
 
These attacks tend to correspond with the targets public statements against the Assad regime, 
and thus functions as punishment. One example is the correlation between Obama’s public 
statements and SEA attacks on western media. CEO of Recorded Future86 states to Mashable 
that it resembles  
 
Actions rebels sometimes take during wartime, such as using a radio station to stop presidents 
from talking. However, in this case, the radio station is the New York Times (Franceschi-
Bicchierai 2013).  
 
The following chart illustrates the correlation between Obama’s public statements and cyber 
attacks by the SEA, leading Recorded Future to characterize the relationship as “propaganda 
warfare” (Franceschi-Bicchierai 2013).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Recorded Future is a private company, which seeks to organize open source information for analysis. It 
focuses on cyber security, corporate security, and competitive intelligence. It is located in Arlington, Cambridge 
and Gothenburg. For more information, visit https://www.recordedfuture.com/about/.  
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Figure 8: Political rhetoric vs. cyber attacks 2011-2013 (Recorded Future, republished in 
Franceschi-Bicchierai 2013).  
 
Both pro- and anti-regime groups reportedly use mediums like Twitter to flood the conflict 
narrative with supportive statements, but as discussed SEA additionally hijack others’ 
accounts. It is set up automatically by using so-called “spambots”; where computers 
automatically send out multiple posts a minute to drown out any unfavorable opinions (York 
2011). The Twitter and Facebook pages are attacked for a number of reasons according to the 
group; for example to influence US public opinion, influence the level and perspective of 
media coverage, or in protest against supposed support of the revolution (Noman 2011b). 
SEA hackers have infiltrated social media accounts on multiple occasions to spread pro-
Assad propaganda disguised as legitimate news. These types of operations usually target 
particular hash tags or social groups, and are a part of a manipulated narrative strategy to 
inflate the number of perceived supporters. Secondly, SEA’s YouTube channel and Facebook 
page is used to create excitement around accomplished hacks and perceived victories. SEA 
also uses social media websites to recruit sympathizers that speak different languages 
(Noman 2011a). As we see from the empirical data, it may also be a way to override public 
warnings of circulating malware in online forums. The networks of automated “spambots” 
thus design a favorable environment where events are presented from only one perspective, 
creating the illusion of legitimacy. This is consequently a potentially effective propaganda 
tactic. To illustrate: 64 bots manage to post about 4 million pro-regime posts on Twitter over 
the course of four months (SECDEV Foundation 2012). They reduce the necessary resources 
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and coordination to secure the same level of exposure using humans, and create an 
impression of a strong support base and legitimacy.  
 
There is no indication of fundamental changes in how this medium is used over the course of 
the conflict. Account hijacking is quite simple, and is usually facilitated through simple 
phishing schemes, demands few resources, and can result in massive attention and agenda 
setting. It is therefore likely that this medium will be used in the same manner in the future. 
However, one key development must be mentioned. There are some indications that account 
hijacking and social media are used to spread spyware and malware tailored for the 
opposition. Using fake or hijacked accounts, the SEA is accused of enticing anti-regime 
individuals to click on links or open attachments, which in the end gives SEA administrator 
rights for the targeted computer. Additionally they are accused of using “spambots” to drown 
warnings of spyware and malware circulating in social media. However, as social media is 
used as a delivery system, the implications of these attacks are discussed below in the section 
relating to malware and spyware. Some reports also claim that information obtained in these 
manners are used together with torture to secure regime agents access to social networking 
sites (Salhani 2013, 2). The stolen log-in credentials are used to spread propaganda, instill 
fear and destabilize communication-networks and gather information. Paralyzing information 
diffusion and destroy communication channels might then limit the movement’s online scope 
and reach.  
 
DDoS, defacements of websites and data dump  
The first chapter of the thesis demonstrated that there are many ways to attack in cyberspace. 
However, the empirical record reflects that some dominate, which is most likely due to their 
low requirements to skills and organization, especially as automated malware is developed 
and spread through the Internet. This case study indicates that data dumps, DDoS and 
defacement are key tactics in the strategies of both pro-regime and anti-regime hackers, 
which corresponds with the technological situation in Syria. It is simple and does not require 
a high level of skills or sophistication. Additionally, more competent hackers publish 
“recipes” on how to complete DDoS and defacements online, thus guiding novices in how to 
complete such attacks. 
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As described in the first chapter, DDoS operates under the logic of a “flood”. By spamming a 
server, it hopes to overflow the capacity and by consequence shut it down. It exists several 
types of software87 that facilitates operations, and they are easily accessible online. Lastly, 
DDoS is also almost untraceable due to the use of VPNs88, botnets89 and proxy servers90. But 
the consequences are limited as the DDoS’ are usually only effective for a short period. It is 
also relatively easy to prevent, mostly through filters that respond to sudden surges in activity 
(Sauter 2013, 17–19). However, successfully attacking popular websites it may create 
attention, which may be the goal of the perpetrator(s). We see in the Figure 9 and 10 that this 
method is common, but do not dominate the chosen action by either faction. This is probably 
as it more complicated to claim “bragging right”. Defacement and data dumps however allow 
the groups to present proof of longer duration and create an electronic graffiti, which may be 
more in sync with the propaganda purpose of their actions.  
 
It is somewhat ironic that the lack of resources has forced the opposition to turn the regime-
developed DDoS software against the creators (Noman 2011a). From 2011 the anti-regime 
version was used to target sites such as the website of government General Organization of 
Radio and TV (rtv.gov.sy), Addounia TV station (addounia.tv), and Syrian news websites 
syriarose.com and syria-news.com (Noman 2011a). The original software was easy to use 
and only required some minor code alterations to be used by the opposition91. One such 
example is the “Syrian Gov Pigs (PIMPED BY XACKER)” version of the tool, where 
targeted websites easily could be overpowered for a limited time (Noman 2011a). This case 
study therefore argues, along with Sauter (2013, 40, 52), that like guerrilla attacks DDoS is 
most effective when complementary to a larger campaign. Especially the SEA has been 
rather successful in this respect, especially after they started to target international news 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 With varying levels of sophistication, and both for purchase and free.  
88 A virtual private Network (VPN) increases the reach of a private network by connecting it through public 
networks like the Internet. By creating a “tunnel” it enables computers to exchange data as if they were located 
within the same closed network.  
89 A botnet (= “net of robots”) is a collection of network (internet)-linked program that communicate with other 
programs to together solve a task. It is often done by robots, and facilitates large-scale spamming of 
commercials or to facilitate DDoS. Certain software can link multiple computers together and thus strengthen 
the capacity of an attack; this is done by so-called “zombie computers”.  
90 A proxy server is when one machine operates as the intermediary between two others. By using this, the 
location and identity of the user can be hidden. It may also be a way of bypassing firewalls or access 
restrictions.  
91 Interestingly, in Syria the opposition has also made certain creative strategy choices. For example have they 
used the Google Crowd Sourcing program “Map Maker” to rename streets, bridges and other key places after 
their heroes. Lynch (2012) report that the activists do so to undermine the perceived reach and power of the 
regime, expunge the symbols of the Assad dynasty, and commemorate their fallen comrades (Khamis, Gold, and 
Vaughn 2012, 12). Though of little consequence, and easily retrieved, the symbolic effect is interesting. 
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media organizations. DDoS is also thus a useful tool for extortion, harassment and censorship 
(Sauter 2013, 10), as it blocks the information flow and can be a short-term nuisance. This 
control probably partly explains why the groups implement the tactic.   
 
It is hard to identify a clear strategy in the anti-regime attacks, but it is clear from the case 
study that data dumps and website defacements are the most common types of attack.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Anti-regime activity in primary data by sub-category  
 
As seen, the anti-regime attacks are dominated by an informational component. One of the 
more active groups of late, Syrian Revolution Electronic Suite (SRES), has successfully 
attacked foreign governments that support the Assad regime. Both Kremlin’s envoy to the 
Far East (www.dfo.gov.ru) and the Lebanese government have experienced attacks, where 
the hackers claim to punish these governments for selling weapons to the Syrian military or 
allowing Hezbollah to support the regime. Anonymous’ first major attack in Syria was in 
August 2011, when members successfully defaced the Syrian Ministry of Defense’s website 
(Salhani 2013, 3). Though of little consequence, it was an international embarrassment to the 
regime. Together with Anonymous and Telecomix, #OpSyria was launched as a global, anti-
Assad effort in cyberspace August/ September 201392. This became an international hacker 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Additionally Anonghost Team, an international hacker group, vandalized the website of the Syrian Ministry 
of Health (Hackers News Bulletin 2013), and an unknown group defaced the website of the Syrian State Media 
SANA. 
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campaign to signal support to the Syrian rebels, which also focused DDoS and defacements 
as weapons against the regime. Interestingly this campaign was launched after Assad 
threatened to shut Internet service in the country93, bringing together individuals from around 
the world under the parole of Internet freedom.  
 
In 2011 SEA organized a four day countdown before they defaced up to 130 websites 
(Noman 2011a). This led to massive international attention, and made defacement a tactic of 
choice also at later stages in the conflict. This research also finds that numerous attacks have 
targeted the websites of global news outlets like Al Jazeera, BBC, AP, Al-Arabya, usually 
simultaneously as phishing campaigns target social media accounts. A second campaign was 
launched in 2013 when SEA attacked several global news agencies (see also Chalabi 2014 or 
appendix for further details), claiming “media is going down” due to biased media coverage 
of the Syrian conflict. This type of attack is simple and easily executed but relatively 
effective. False stories and statements are posted as a means to disinformation campaigns, as 
well as creating attention for the group. According to the SEA, it does not seek to destroy 
websites permanently, only “voice the truth” (Noman 2011b). Sharing many characteristics 
with vandalism and graffiti, defacement has little effect on a conflict directly but may create 
attention and fame for the sender. The attacked western websites are not necessarily political, 
and reflect a strategy of opportunity similar to that of the anti-regime efforts. The SEA will 
favor the more prominent websites, but will attack whatever vulnerabilities they come across 
to get attention. This is a strategy that may be successful in creating the “fog of war”, distrust 
and confusion, as defacement and alterations make it complicated to verify information and 
identify senders. Following NATO doctrine division between white, grey and black 
propaganda, defacement makes it harder for the recipient to distinguish between the genuine 
and truthful information and what is altered. If these consequences do not materialize, then 
the intrusion is at least a propaganda victory as it proves the opposing party’s inability to 
secure and protect property.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 However, the Assad regime has closed Internet access on several occasions, but blames opposition sabotage 
or faulted infrastructure.  	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Figure 10: Pro-regime attacks in primary data by sub-category 
 
In the beginning of 2013, it became clear that SEA had developed a new tactic to discredit 
the anti-regime movement. By publishing stolen documents from government servers in 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the group hoped to provide evidence that the revolution was 
foreign backed and not “the people movement” the opposition claimed. The documents are of 
little security importance, but assist the SEA in building an image of transparency and 
legitimacy for the Assad regime (SECDEV Foundation 2013b, 1–2).  Data dumps are also the 
most favored tactic by the anti-regime hackers (43% of registered attacks), who have 
embarrassed the regime on several occasions. The most noteworthy is the publication of 
President Assad’s personal email on two occasions in 2012, and the publication of address 
details, phone number, more than 100 email addresses and encrypted passwords belonging to 
the Hayan Petroleum Company of Syria, and Anonymous’ leak of SEA’s servers.  
 
Now moving beyond these low level attacks, we will see that a new trend in the Syrian cyber 
conflict. Espionage by software is becoming a more widespread, complementary tactic to the 
traditional online sabotage. Though not representing a new level of skills or sophistication, 
this is worrisome due to the potentially more serious, real world consequences for the 
individuals identified and targeted.  
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Malware and Spyware  
The most serious form of cyber attacks seen in the Syrian conflict is by far spyware and 
malware. There are accusations that the software is used to identify and locate individuals, 
whom are later tortured or abused as “enemies of the regime” due to their support of the 
opposition94. Spyware and malware therefore resembles real world espionage at a higher 
level than the low sophistication vandalism of account hijacking, defacement and DDoS. The 
spyware also adds a second dimension to online sabotage, as it allows for a new level of 
impersonations. It is therefore likely that the growing use of spyware will lead to a growing 
self-censorship and distrust in Syrian cyberspace. While the two former types are aggravating 
and may serve a propaganda purpose, this third kind of behavior may impact individuals’ 
lives and health directly.  
 
Brumfield (2012) and Khamis, Gold and Vaughn (2012, 11) find that specific pro-regime 
cyber-campaigns are tailored to target the opposition’s supporters, and that the information is 
returned to a server belonging to a state-owned telecommunication company located within 
Syria. The information obtained is then used for online impersonations, which allows for 
further spread of spy-Trojans into the communication network. According to the CNN,  
 
Supporters of dictator Bashar al-Assad first steal the identities of opposition activists, then 
impersonate them in online chats. They gain the trust of other users, pass out Trojan horse 
viruses and encourage people to open them. Once on the victim's computer, the malware 
sends information out to third parties (Brumfield 2012).  
 
This case study, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EEF) and Salhani (2013, 2) find that the 
pro-regime social engineering campaign is ongoing from March 2012. A coordinated 
campaign using software was also recorded by EEF in June 2013, but is believed to have 
started about six months earlier (Scott-Railton and Marquis-Boire 2013, 6). Online 
impersonations and electronic surveillance has therefore been incorporated as part of the 
counterinsurgency strategy for about two years. Cloned YouTube pages, interference on 
Facebook, and Skype and Adobe Flash Player malware are examples of the operations 
undertaken. The Information Warfare Monitor additionally reports that false URLs and log-in 
pages for social media networks are established to coax credentials and distribute hidden 
malware (Fisher and Keller 2011). It then spreads the malware to members of the network 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 There are also accusations that online oppinions  and private corrospondance are used as ”proof” of anti-
establishment behavior.  
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hidden in fake anti-Assad videos or documents. Opening these will install the malware, 
potentially give control of webcams and microphones (Siegel and Marquis-Boire 2013). The 
malware usually also take over control of the infected computer and gives access to files, 
online communication, emails, Skype conversations and Facebook chats. The campaigns 
appear coordinated as multiple attacks use the same RAT, named DarkComet, and the 
software report to the same Syrian IP address. The campaign also advanced by using another 
RAT, Blackshades Remote Controller, which allows registration of keystrokes and remote 
screenshots. There are also indications that the culpable is the same groups that stole social 
media log-in credentials in March 2012 by malware hidden in a fake Adobe Flash Player 
update (Galperin and Marquis-Boire 2012). A third RAT, ShadowTech, is also widely used 
(Scott-Railton and Marquis-Boire 2013, 6), which can be downloaded from both English and 
Arabic sites with instruction videos found on YouTube. The use of software must however 
not be interpreted as a higher technical expertise, and that we are moving towards the “cyber 
wars” discussed at the beginning of this thesis. The software is easily obtainable online as it 
is developed by a few skilled individuals and distributed to a greater network. Consequently 
one does not need a high technical competence to use such tools.  
 
As described, Botnets allow for overload of networking profiles, flooding profiles with spam 
until they crash. It has been described as the most holistic response to online campaigns in the 
Arab Spring (Fisher and Keller 2011), forcing spread of pro-Assad narrative both 
domestically and internationally. Using automated “Zombie” Facebook and Twitter accounts, 
the spread of such malware may impact entire communication communities. As an 
illustration, anti-regime activists were targeted by a cloned YouTube website 95  that 
distributed malware, which both stole log-in credentials and left the attacker in command of 
the infected computer in 2012 (EFF 2012, in Salhani 2013). SEA is also accused of 
developing malware that targeted the Facebook interface and ultimately gave the developer 
control of profiles. This malware was spread by posting fake pro-revolutionary links, 
prompting “likes” and “shares”. By visiting URL links, malware infected the profile, which 
then are used to spread pro-regime information under a false persona (Shehabat 2012). Lastly 
Skype has been the target of the mentioned Trojan “DarkComet (RAT)”, which enables 
control of webcam, disables certain antivirus programs, record keystrokes, steals passwords 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 The fake YouTube page looked similar to the real site, but prompted visitors to update their Flash update. 
When doing so, a hidden code trojaned a spyware into the victimized computer and gave full administrative 
control. According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the malware was most common in videos likely to be 
visited by anti-regime sympathizers.   
	  60	  
and sends the information back to the attacker (Galbren et.al, 2012, referred in Shehabat 
2012). This type of campaign, if lead by the SEA, is disturbing and indicates some 
development as the malware disrupts perceived secured connections and facilitate extensive 
surveillance. Thus tools the opposition uses to circumvent regime control is turned against 
them, adding yet another source of “the Fog of War”. By attacking the communal trust, the 
center of gravity may also be damaged.   
 
The case study shows that the anti-regime faction of the conflict is at a lower level of impact 
and sophistication due to lacking organization and resources. Some countermeasures have 
been implemented with international assistance, but these are limited to protective measures. 
Sites that explain in Arabic how to protect anonymity, secure online communication, and 
remove potentially dangerous online information have been developed, but this is more of a 
defensive measure while the SEA is clearly offensive. Telecomix further assists in moving 
pictures and videos out of Syria, and established a video portal for the spread of news 
(Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn 2012, 14).  The European Cyber Army also claims to have 
caused a near nationwide internet outage in March 2014, though the regime blame a faulted 
optic cable (Peterson 2014). This study finds no record of spyware or malware by the anti-
regime groups. It demonstrates the trends already discussed, with the SEA as the most active 
and offensive party to the Syrian cyber conflict. There are, as illustrated, many similarities 
between the anti-regime groups situation in cyberspace and the real world. 
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The Syrian cyber battle of narratives  
 
The following section of this thesis will evaluate the state of the Syrian cyber battle. It will 
bring together the empirical record and evaluate the greater meaning behind the attacks 
reported. First it will look at the state of the current cyber battle of narratives. The second 
sub-section tests the assumptions of the thesis, and the third attempts to answer if the Syrian 
events qualify as a soft war in cyberspace.  
 
The Syrian regime has clearly studied the course of events in Egypt and Tunisia. Having 
more time to prepare, Assad’s followers reflect a clear narrative strategy where blocking 
information flow is key. However, they cunningly focused their efforts on certain times and 
locations to limit potential backlash and not to enrage the Syrian population. For example, 
Khamis, Gold and Vaugn (2012, 12) finds that Internet connectivity was initially shut down 
on Fridays, weekends and holidays in troublesome areas to prevent mass protests while 
limiting the potential economic losses experienced by the Egyptian government. After some 
time the Syrian regime also restored Internet connectivity (Shehabat 2012), but sophisticated 
filtering and censoring technology are used extensively. Despite the low penetration rate, 
Internet activity is closely monitored by the regime’s surveillance system and the Syrian 
regime has a history of detaining citizens that express opinions or spread information online 
(Shehabat 2012).  Instead of the neutral domain for information sharing and recruitment, 
cyberspace may become a honeypot to trap and infiltrate the opposition.  
 
The SEA is spearheading the most visible cyber operations in the Arab Spring and provides 
an alternative to the Egyptian and Libyan regimes’ response to rebels organizing online. 
These regimes closed Internet access, but failed as the opposition adapted and used proxies 
and dial-ups to circumvent regime-control (Fisher and Keller 2011). The Syrian conflict 
however is now as present in cyberspace as the physical world, and it may be the first regime 
in the region to target the potent effects of organizing counter-revolutionaries in this domain. 
Like this case study, a report by Citizenlab (Al Jazeera, The Stream Team 2013) also finds 
that the pro-regime hackers use a formula consisting of social media manipulation, malware, 
and remote-access devices. The regime supporters are thus able to halter operations by the 
opposition by manipulating many of the same online tools as the “people online-movements” 
use.  Interestingly, they also target software formerly used by revolutionaries to circumvent 
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regime control. Consequently they turn the cyber weapons of the Arab Spring against the 
revolutionaries in Syria. They utilize global software as YouTube, Dropbox, email and 
Facebook to spread malware, operating outside of territorial borders and choosing victims 
based on ideological or political sympathies. The SEA is also interesting, as it does not 
appear to distinguish between international and domestic adversaries. Any organization or 
individual that appears anti-Assad is considered an adversary and eligible for misdirection, 
espionage, or sabotage. 
 
This case study shows that the pro-regime fraction of the conflict, exemplified by SEA, has 
recorded over 80 attacks that have been reported in foreign media. Several additional attacks 
are also recorded in the secondary data. It is likely that the real number is much greater, but 
that these have not gained the desired attention in international media and the research 
community. Analysis Intelligence also records a tenfold number of references to SEA 
compared to any other actor in 2013 (Holden 2013), much due to its massive campaigns 
targeting international highly profiles in the first six months of the year. This is an impressive 
number of successful attacks at the hands of a minor group consisting of only a few 
members96. By targeting people like President Obama and global news media, the SEA 
secured high coverage and continued reporting on its activity. As the case study has shown 
the main type of victims is news media, attacked due to their portrayal of the Assad regime.  
 
The most sophisticated attacks to date are the hacks of US military. While the first was only a 
defacement of the US Marines website (in September 2013), the second was illegal access to 
the military knowledge base CENTCOM97 (in March 2014). This attack is at the time of 
writing yet to be confirmed by the military, but analysts agree that the pictures published 
indicate that the SEA penetrated the web portal. It is unlikely that the documents accessed 
were of great national security importance, but the propaganda effects were considerable. 
This research also indicates that this was SEA’s goal when targeting CENTCOM, as they 
were aware of the massive attention such a breach would conjure. SEA’s many attacks have 
also placed the group on the FBI’s terrorist lists (Neal 2013), giving the group even more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 According to their new website (04.04.14) the key members are “The Soul”, “Vict0r”, “The Shadow”, 
“TH3PR0”, “Syrian Eagle”, “TH3MUS3”, and three additional unnamed individuals (SEA 2014).   
97 U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is one of nine unified commands in the United States military. Six of 
these commands, including CENTCOM, have an area of responsibility (AOR), which is a specific geographic 
region of the world where the combatant commanders may plan and conduct operations (CENTCOM n.d.) 
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fame. Lacking sophisticated technical capability, Holden (2013) categorizes their work as “a 
guerrilla public relations campaign to put pro-Assad propaganda in front of western readers”. 
 
The case study indicate SEA’s hacking strategy in the beginning was divided into three focus 
areas: a) defacement attacks against Syrian opposition’s websites; b) defacement attacks 
against western websites; and c) spamming popular Facebook pages with pro-regime 
comments (see also Fisher and Keller 2011; or Noman 2011b). The current SEA website, 
launched in the spring of 2014, divides the strategy to three somewhat similar axes: a) 
Twitter propaganda, b) Facebook propaganda, and c) hacks of any Assad enemy. Though the 
past low sophistication attack strategy has continued, SEA’s change in organizational 
structure from late 2011 has also led to a greater focus on international victims. Over time 
they have also broadened their scope, now claiming that any information that reflects 
negatively on the Assad regime is considered “hostile” and a fabrication of facts (SEA 2014; 
SECDEV Foundation 2013a, 3). Secondly, defacement is replaced with propaganda as the 
most important purpose. This may indicate that the role of the narrative has gained 
importance at the cost of simply controlling the flow of information. The changes in 
organizational structure may also have lead to new expertise and human capital, thus 
allowing more proficient hacking than simply attacking through spearfishing. Now the group 
is for example able to exploit vulnerabilities in WordPress software. They also have gained 
access to surveillance spyware like “Dark Comet” and “BlackShades” (Perlroth 2013). 
Disguising an encryption service within Skype requires some sophistication, but this must not 
be interpreted that the group has abandoned its former low-sophistication tactics. These still 
forms the majority of SEA attacks today98, and no attacks recorded in this case study can be 
classified as high sophistication. However, the softer effects may still be real. Surveillance 
may seriously hamper the work of the opposition, and imposes a self-censorship as it is 
impossible to know how is watching. Potentially Big Brother may always see you, obviously 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 The Syrian government however focuses their efforts on identifying and tracking opposition members, much 
helped by cyber tools. The Syrian government launched in 2011 a wide reaching software system targeting 
emails and Internet website traffic. The investment cost the regime more than $7.2 million and was sold by the 
Italian company Area SpA. It depends on the technology of Hewlett Packard and NetApp Inc. (both US based 
companies), Utimaco Safeware AG (Germany) and Qosmos SA (France)(Baiazy 2012, 20). The system includes 
capabilities for installing probes in mobile- and Internet providers, mapping of contacts, and hacking emails 
accounts (Baiazy 2012, 20). Iranian experts have also trained Syrian technicians in Internet surveillance, and 
these tasks are a potential “safe” way of completing the 18-month conscription duties (Baiazy 2012, 20). It is 
likely that the SEA is either involved or assisting in this surveillance campaign.  
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a terrifying prospect for any anti-regime establishment. As discussed, the links between SEA 
and the regime are unclear, but again we see that they mutually benefit from each other.  
 
The case study shows that the anti-regime attacks are fewer and have less impact. This is 
because the Syrian society lacks the necessary civilian human capital to wage a cybered 
conflict between equal fronts. We have seen that Syria has a short technological history and a 
strong tradition for control and censorship online. The regime routinely block global sites and 
social media, controls the infrastructure, intimidates bloggers, and has a higher capacity in 
use of surveillance software. In sum this leads to a more asymmetrical online conflict in Syria 
than what was experienced in Egypt. From May to June 2011 the opposition could do little 
more than produce some videos (see also Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn 2014, 424), while the 
regime studied the Arab Spring revolts with care. Though the use of social media as a 
platform for information sharing was quickly adopted, the element of hacking was not 
included. However, after some time, the opposition increased its sophistication with help 
from the diaspora and international hacker communities (Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn 2014, 
424). Today, though of small measures, the opposition has successfully hacked and published 
President Assad’s personal emails, web defaced the Syrian Parliament website, completed 
DDoS attacks on TV stations like “Al Donya”, and removed SEA’s Facebook pages on 
several occasions in 2012 and 2013 (Shehabat 2012). In total, SEA has been forced to re-
launch their Facebook page more than 239 times; mostly due to mass reported complaints on 
SEA violations of Facebook Terms of Use agreement. It is likely that the opposition targeted 
social media as their resources limited their options, and removal of the social media 
accounts allowed for disruption in the pro-regime information flow. However, this research 
also indicates is that the pro-regime groups responded by taking use of more sophisticated 
tactics like online sabotage and surveillance, thus crushing potential developments in the anti-
regime opposition’s level of sophistication. Though they still lack the necessary unity and 
skill, with the help of international hacker communities, they are more effective in launching 
campaigns that gain attention while hiding from the regime. Thus the opposition has, like the 
anti-regime groups in the real world, depended on aid from abroad.  
 
This case study illustrate that, at the present time, the pro-regime non-state actors are winning 
the cyber battle. However the anti-regime activists also have a great presence in cyberspace, 
though more in social media and video sharing websites then hacktivist activities (Bogart 
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2013)99. New media is therefore used to promote the movement and discredit the regime, as 
the protesters have seen succeed in both Egypt and Tunisia (see also Rogan 2011, 483–499). 
The focus is thus to counter the regime’s presentation of events and issues, and to influence 
international news agencies’ reports of the Syrian conflict. This is also why the anti-regime 
attacks have focused on data dumps, hoping to provide proof of an unjust regime. However, 
the Syrian regime and its supporters have evolved and adopted cyberspace as a domain of 
narratives. The anti-regime groups have however not demonstrated sufficient innovation to 
counter the more prepared Syrian regime, compared to Egypt and Tunisia. They have thus 
not been able to define the form and field of battle, as found by Arreguin-Toft to be they key 
to success for the weakest party. Both the theoretical foundation and the case study has 
shown that a key element in any conflict is to shape the understanding of the war’s causes, 
chronology and perceived winner. Attention can thus shape both policy and agenda in a 
hamlet, a country or the international community. Cyberspace provides a new medium in 
which the opposing parties attempt to shape perceptions and write how history is told. By 
forming the conflict narrative, the long-term political effects are therefore in theory infinite. 
However, as the effects are beyond the scope of this thesis and to complex to measure at the 
present time for the ongoing Syrian conflict, we must conclude that the international 
perception is possibly affected, not shaped, by the work of the SEA and the opposition 
groups. We will now move to the assumptions and to what extent they are supported by the 
case study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 As social media presence is not the object of study in this thesis, such empirical record has not been included.  
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Testing the assumptions in Syria  
The research question guiding this work is “why and how do non-state actors use cyberspace 
in modern conflict”. The following section of this thesis will evaluate to what extent the 
underpinning assumptions are proven true in the Syrian case. As we remember, they were 
summarized by five statements: (1) Non-state actors use cyberspace in conflicts;  (2) 
Subversion is the ultimate goal of their actions in cyberspace; (3) This is done by spreading a 
strategic narrative and build soft power; (4) To reach their goal, they use guerrilla tactics; (5) 
The effectiveness is determined by level of organization and resources.  
 
The case study clearly demonstrates that non-state actors use and manipulate cyberspace in 
the Syrian conflict. There are two structural reasons for this. Firstly, technological advances 
are fundamentally altering the mechanisms of asymmetrical conflicts (Wallace and Reeves 
2013, 1). The covert warfare currently taking place in cyberspace thus resembles to some 
extent the covert operations of the Cold War (Kallberg and Thuraisingham 2013, 7).  Attacks 
are undertaken by an unknown adversary, aimed at sabotage and espionage as part of a 
greater strategy. Secondly and the most relevant for the first assumption is the fact that, in 
cyberspace, individual actors and loosely connected groups have advantages if holding 
limited goals of strategy100(Nye 2010, 13). As attribution is complicated and the environment 
of cyberspace resembles a maze, the non-state actors are able to facilitate hit and run 
operations where they may gain attention and inflict damage with little fear of consequences. 
For the same reasons it becomes an ideal environment for states to enlist the help of non-state 
actors or for non-state actors to coordinate political movements101. The non-state actors are 
therefore able to secure attention and have effect beyond what their relative position entails. 
 
What the case study also has shown is that it is not the intention to undermine their opponent 
to the level of conquest. It is therefore not a domain of war, but one of conflict for the non-
state actors. Remembering the cyberwar debate in the theoretical chapter, this thesis thus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Attacks with great consequences (like Stuxnet) demand to many resources to be completed by these types of 
groups, sponsorship by greater organizations are therefore required. However the groups discussed in this thesis 
tend to limit themself to ”cyber hooligan behavior” like defacement and DDoS, which are not that technically 
challenging. Additionally the loose confederation limits the risk of detainment.  
101 Though reality of lethal cyber war may be questioned, the effects are negative. For example are cyber 
espionage and sabotage becoming the most pressing threats in cyberspace today (Mulvenon and Rattray 2012a, 
xiv–xv; Rid 2013), costing both strategic edge and economic gains. As resources to an increasing extent are 
located in cyberspace, the denial of services (DDoS) is also becoming an integrated part of conflict as seen for 
example in Estonia 2007 (Mulvenon and Rattray 2012a, xv). 
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rejects the belief of cyberspace as a fruitless domain for war. This can only be true if 
measuring success as defeat in the real world due to actions in cyberspace. This case study 
however demonstrates that this measurement of success is faulted, as the non-state actors use 
cyberspace as a domain for distribution of narrative in conflicts. The real effects of non-state 
combat in cyberspace is thus not linked to “cyber Pearl Harbor” and other doomsday 
scenarios, but as a domain for the propaganda and subversion. However, the potential 
destabilizing effects are also limited and it is therefore unlikely that cyberspace will become 
an independent domain of conflict. A more likely scenario found in this case study is 
therefore that cyberspace provides a mouthpiece with little costs, risks and global reach. 
Publicity, image-building and propaganda distribution therefore becomes the measurement of 
success in cyberspace, working in tandem with the action on the ground. 
 
The case study has clearly shown that the goal of non-state actors in cyberspace is attention 
and to gain legitimacy. Especially in the case of SEA, this strategy is clear. This is probably 
also why they focus their efforts on foreign actors, as this gains more international attention 
and force their agenda on the international audience. Also, the current anti-regime cyber 
forces do not present a genuine opponent as the SEA currently dominates the Syrian cyber 
conflict. This case study indicates a compromise as the domain provides fewer risks than 
engaging in real world combat, but simultaneously the power of agenda setting is 
questionable. Attention is their ultimate goal, but they can only choose to attack victims that 
create attention (international media) but have little control over what level and type of 
attention their actions result in.  
 
SEA, as the most likely case, it should be clear that non-state actors use cyberspace as a 
domain for conflict. Regardless, even the most active and sophisticated group SEA, has a 
limited reach and the impact of their operations is questionable. Therefore it is a tentative 
conclusion that the SEA, and possibly similar groups, attacks what can be described as “low 
hanging fruit”; targets that are rather easy and hope that this will create the outcome they 
desire. To call them powerful however, will be wrong as they have little control or ability to 
shape others’ behavior, perspective and responses. Their power is limited to an attempt to 
form a favorable environment to present their subversive argumentation. Thus we must 
conclude that it is at best a contributing factor. It can be understood as an “informational 
guerrilla movement” (Castells 1997, 79) or “social netwar” (Ronfeldt 1998, 1), where the 
actors utilize the traditional hit and run tactics and guerrilla strategy to play to their strengths 
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in an asymmetrical information war. As we saw at the beginning of this thesis, subversion 
refers to the (attempted) breakdown of social bonds where social rules and principles are 
altered. This is undertaken to undermine a system, a community or a group. This case study 
has shown that the non-state actors attack each other to damage the opposition’s relative 
power and position. By undermining their role domestically and/or internationally, they hope 
to win the informational propaganda war undertaken in cyberspace. The case study thus 
indicates that non-state actors in cyberspace primarily try to impact on the softer side of 
warfare, meaning how it is perceived102.  
 
The case study also shows that the non-state actors do not require a high level of 
sophistication to gain attention. Independently the cyber attacks are an annoyance, but 
together they may create a subversive campaign and may contribute to undermining the 
standing of a regime or an opposition group. Especially in repressive regimes the cyber 
attacks of anti-regime groups can embarrass and undermine the ruling elite, possibly 
facilitating real world rebellions. Cyber operations of low sophistication can also help build 
an image on the international stage, possibly creating perceptions of relative strengths and 
legitimacy. At a lowest level, the attention and use of spambots may drown opposing 
opinions 103 . They seek to gain attention for their operations to project an image as 
undefeatable, and to frighten their opposition. The perceptions are therefore demonstrated as 
more important than the actual course of events. The case study has shown that especially the 
SEA is rather successful in gaining attention though, as previously discussed; they cannot be 
labeled as powerful as they cannot control the responses to their actions. They can however 
promote a favorable perception, where their narrative is seen as “the truth”.  As the country is 
in the middle of a civil war, confirming and refuting allegations is next to impossible. The 
truth is therefore less important than perceptions. However, as we have seen in the case 
study, regardless of domain, the effects are complicated to measure and uncertain for soft 
tactics like propaganda and narratives. Therefore the case study indicates that subversion is a 
goal, but its realization unknown.  
 
We can expect more from all directions. In war, the greatest casualty is the truth. Each side 
will try to manipulate information to make their own side look like it is gaining while the 
other is losing (Fitzpatrick 2012).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Any violent effect of subversive operations in this domain is ultimately indirect and uncertain. In 
consequence, violence may be orchestrated through cyberspace but the effects are not guaranteed. 
103 However, as noted, such a campaign can be impeded by rather easy means such as surveillance software and 
contra-cyber attacks. 
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As we see in Syria, attacking media can be an effective way of securing greater attention than 
the groups standing is due. By using social media and manipulation of online communication 
channels, the groups are able to reach a greater audience. Also the accusations of 
impersonations and cooperation with the regime may prove sufficient in deterring supporters 
to join the cause, regardless of the truth to the relationship and extent of information sharing. 
Consequently the narrative of strong cyber “police” may instill fear, and their extensive 
media coverage confirms their presence and level of activity. So, regardless of the regime’s 
relationship with the SEA, the mere rumor of its’ existence may prove potent. This may also 
be a way to spread a message of fear similar to the “night letters” seen in Afghanistan. David 
Kilcullen calls this “armed propaganda”, where brutal actions enforces the effects of 
communication strategies (Bøe-Hansen 2010, 36). The fear of retaliation can spread much 
further than to the actual recipient of the letter, thus increasing the effective use of resources 
and power projection.  
 
The non-state actors focus their resources and efforts at the second level to build a different 
form of public discourse than what would happen without interference. Domestically both 
parties challenge the others’ narrative and hinder diffusion either by blocking the necessary 
infrastructure or by embarrassing the other by publishing personal emails and pictures, 
circumventing their obstacles and promoting a subversive domestic discourse. Perceptions 
and the battle of hearts and minds is a clear variable in the Syrian conflict, a society with a 
fractioned population and an opposition lacking leadership. There is an ongoing battle of 
perception and narrative between the parties, both targeting the population and the 
international audience (Nissen 2013). The argumentation either builds on the legitimate right 
to uphold law and peace in the sovereign territory or, or the right to rebel against unjust 
leaders. The enemy is either described as foreign-backed criminals without respect for law 
and order, or as maniac regime run by corruption and oppression. Both use video and photos 
actively to present stories and evidence supporting their narrative. Common is also proof of 
inhumane behavior at the hand of the other (Nissen 2013, 77), thus legitimizing the struggle 
for survival of the sender. The Syrian cyber actors vary greatly in their success in gaining 
attention for their cause, with SEA currently winning. However their greatest success in the 
battle of the narrative is limiting the work of the opposition by damaging sabotage and 
espionage. The lack of major defections from the regime also indicate a continued support for 
the Assad government, and the volume of cyber attacks by the SEA may contribute to a 
“band-wagon” effect where the perceived support of the regime is high. This may in turn 
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encourage others to support the regime. Both sides of the conflict paint the other as brutal and 
dangerous, also possibly creating a sense of hopelessness for the unaligned individuals who 
in turn do not support either.  
 
History, as they say, is written by the winners. Information warfare, then, is effectively about 
good PR. But in a wartime environment, elements of kinetic conflict and information 
dissemination are inextricably linked. The battle is for control of the media, but in the early 
21st Century, even that term is far more nebulous than before. The channels for disseminating 
information have exploded into social media, websites, VoIP communications and 
videoconferencing (Bradsbury 2013, 16). 
 
By claiming that the opposition is supported and lead by foreign powers, the SEA seeks to 
undermine the revolution’s legitimacy. The opposition on the other hand claims to be 
representatives of the people, and naturally SEA and the regime refutes this. Secondly, its’ 
cyber operations builds a perception that the regime is still strong and should be feared. 
Thirdly, by spreading accusations of human rights violations at the hand of the opposition the 
regime is able to undermine the moral authority of protesters against a despotic regime. In 
total, these factors may contribute to regime recruitment or passivity in the citizenry but 
obviously the results are next to impossible to measure at the current time, and are therefore 
simply speculations. 
 
The Syrian conflict is the most socially mediated conflict in history (Lynch, Freelon, and 
Aday 2014). Simultaneously as individuals believe that they receive unmediated information 
through these mediums, and the content of social media is re-reported in mainstream, 
traditional news. Together this makes the manipulation of social and online media valuable as 
a target. The massive attacks on social media platforms and news media indicate that the 
Syrian non-state actors actively use cyber attacks to shape perceptions and frame events. This 
is true for both sides of the conflict. Also the manipulation of stolen social media profiles by 
the SEA demonstrates the importance of such behavior. By using online impersonations they 
promote their narrative and exploit the credibility of whomever their stolen profile belong to. 
The fear of being ousted to the regime by liking and sharing videos distributed by false 
persona, may deter supportive individuals from contributing similarly to how we see 
criminals fear infiltration by law enforcement.   
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Propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, 
and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist 
(Jowett and O’Donnel 1999, 6) 104.  
 
Telling the best story, thus presenting the most appealing narrative105, is a key element to 
winning new wars (Leuprecht et al. 2010, 42). This must be tailored to a specific audience 
and follow the same structure as most fairytales: some are good, some are bad, grievances 
must be revenged and if following a certain recipe one will “live happily ever after” 
(Casebeer and Russel 2005, 1–5). Common tactical steps to build a narrative are presenting 
the targeted group with a terrifying threat, reports of attacks and abuse, a dehumanized the 
opposition, and framing support as the only viable position (Nissen 2013, 76). Narratives also 
utilize tactics like name-calling, in-group mentality, generalities, burial of opposing evidence, 
and calls for others to join the cause (Maliukevičius 2006, 139). Actors use this strategic 
narrative to justify claims and motivate action, assisted by culturally shared beliefs and 
understandings (Garrett 2006, 206).  
 
We see clearly distinguishable narratives in the Syrian conflict, actively pushed in all forms 
of ICT. New technology has expanded and changed the role of communications, and the 
possible channels to spread a narrative. This makes media skills, persuasion and socialization 
fundamental in contemporary conflict (Castells 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998, referred in 
Garrett 2006).   The case study has also demonstrated that especially the SEA has insights 
into the opposition’s emotional and societal preferences. They tailor their operations to 
wherever and whatever software that is likely to be used by the opposition, thus dominating 
the environment. By focusing their efforts in the domain favored by insurgents in Egypt and 
Tunisia, the power of this domain has been not been realized for the Syrian opposition 
groups. Sophisticated social engineering based in a deep understanding of the opposition’s 
needs, interests and weaknesses (Scott-Railton and Marquis-Boire 2013) is therefore a 
common theme in the attacks of the SEA. They identify themselves as the “underdog” and 
the “righteous warriors” fighting the dangerous villains that are destabilizing their beloved 
Syria. They truly believe that they are “the last frontier” (Furlow and Goodall Jr. 2011, 218), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 It is further divided into white, gray and black propaganda depending on to what extent the sender of 
information is explicit.  
105 Narrative as used in this thesis signifies strategic narratives. This is understood as “a tool for political actors 
to change the discursive environment in which they operate, manage expectations, and extend their influence’; 
they are ‘representations of a sequence of events and identities, a communicative tool through which political 
actors, usually elites, attempt to give determined meanings to past, present and future in order to achieve 
political objectives” (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle (2012, 3-4), quoted in O´Hagan 2013, 561). 
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chosen to fight as an answer to a higher calling. They manipulate emotional considerations 
and tailor their attacks to fit the ideology or curiosity of the targeted victim. Sharing videos or 
documents with titles like “Assad’s Human Rights Abuses”, the malware easily spread within 
groups that object to the current regime. As log-in credentials are stolen it is also difficult to 
trust any sender of information, and as a force multiplier malware is now hidden within 
software that is suppose to circumvent regime surveillance.  
 
The legal and technical restrictions, as well as the climate of fear are shaping the discourse 
online (Bogart 2013).  
 
Narrative’s argumentation often bases its arguments in past injustices and future horrors 
(Furlow and Goodall Jr. 2011, 219), dehumanizing the enemy. Assad has continuously 
accused the rebels of tearing the country apart, and presented his regime as the only solution 
and leadership possible (Shehadi 2013). In Syria’s cyber conflict, the turbulent history of the 
country and its former victimization to imperial forces are manipulated to argue a narrative of 
Assad as the protector who secures the wellbeing of all Syrians. Also tapping into past 
grievances (Rogan 2011), this type of narrative has great resonance in the citizenry for both 
historical and cultural reasons (for a detailed overview of Syrian history, see Rogan 2011). 
The opposition is therefore branded as foreign backed troublemakers, only interested in 
enriching themselves. By using the hatred of Israel and the US, as seen in the Twitter pictures 
presented before (Figure 5,6 and 7), a conspiracy is narrated. This narrative justifies actions 
and certain behaviors, as it creates a perception of injustice and what Stout (2004, p. 1; in 
Furlow and Goodall Jr. 2011, 215) calls “self-righteous violence”. The actors attempt to 
undermine the position of “the other” by character assassination and name calling, white and 
black presentations of moral issues, and self-proclaimed moral superiority (Wilcox, 2005; in 
Furlow and Goodall Jr. 2011, 217). The argumentation builds on the belief that the sender has 
the only solution to an essential problem, and the solution is based in an ideological belief 
that often justifies some use of violence “for the greater good”.  
 
The Syrian opposition worked hard to craft a narrative for the international media of a 
peaceful, pro Western uprising, and the Syrian regime sought to portray their challengers as 
radical Islamists supported by nefarious outsiders (Lynch, Freelon, and Aday 2014, 8).  
 
Throughout the revolution, the Assad regime has used its stronghold in the media to push a 
narrative of the revolution as a western conspiracy lead by USA and Israel (see also Khamis, 
Gold, and Vaughn 2012, 9–10). This narrative is further pushed by SEA in its online 
publications, as illustrated by the pictures presented before (Figure 3, 4 and 5). Lync et.al 
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(2014, 10) however finds that the same is true for all fighting groups in Syria. They develop 
tailored narratives appealing to their demographics. For example, a secular activist pushes a 
narrative of the opposition as a moderate force opposing human rights abuses to attract 
western support, whilst Islamist groups highlight the importance of Sala and Jihadist spirit to 
secure funding from Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. The narrative serves as inspiration, motivation, 
and provides a raison Raison d'être for fighters and supporters alike. In sum, it builds a bridge 
between “hearts and minds” and the physical world. 
 
Large governments depend on large systems, political support and soft power. Non-state 
actors however are not limited by these constraints and may adapt “hit and run”-tactics as 
traditionally seen by guerrilla movements due to their flexibility (Nye 2010, 13). The 
consequences may be limited, but if the aim is disruption and attention then its realization 
may not be hard. The parties in this case study utilize hit and run tactics to build a subversive 
momentum against the stronger party. At the time of writing the stronger party, SEA, is the 
most successful but also this group uses guerrilla tactics. The anonymity, low costs of entry, 
and the asymmetry of vulnerability and power; all nurtures the position of Syrian non-state 
actors in cyberspace.  
 
The case study demonstrates that the actors use the same guerrilla tactics as in real world 
conflicts, and follow Mao’s recommendation of melting into the citizenry. Hit-and-run 
attacks, deception, sabotage and espionage are all used to push ones’ agenda. Their attacks 
are minor and small-scale, characterized by opportunity. They also seem to favor civilian 
targets, as these are less protected, much as traditional guerrillas. Due to their relative 
weakness, they are not able to challenge the military command and control systems. This 
demands another level of expertise and sophistication than available, but by focusing on 
media and prominent individuals, they are able to obtain the desired attention with the means 
available. Remembering the understanding of guerrilla warfare described in the beginning of 
thesis, we see clear similarities between guerrilla warfare in the real and virtual world. Also 
remembering Arreguin-Toft’s work, the weaker party may be successful is refusing to follow 
the rules of the relatively stronger party. However, the more resourceful party, SEA, is 
winning as the opposition is operating within a conflict parameter decided and controlled by 
SEA.   
 
The actors themselves also show similarities with our traditional understanding of guerrillas. 
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They are characterized by loose organizations with some formal structure. However, the 
individuals are volunteers that decide themselves the level of commitment to the cause.  They 
avoid direct confrontation with each other and the military establishment, except in the case 
where the SEA hacked the US military. However, the more sophisticated event is still 
limited, as they did not gain access to documents of national security and cannot be 
categorized as a military provocation.  
 
Cyberspace is unlike traditional warfare, but it shares some characteristics with the historical 
role of aerial bombardment, submarine warfare, special operations and assassins. Specifically, 
it can inflict painful, asymmetric damage on an adversary from a distance or by exploiting the 
element of surprise (Geers 2011, 12). 
 
Both parties use the guerrilla tactics presented at the beginning of this thesis, but with 
different levels of success, much as seen in the real world. Also similar is the focus on 
attention instead of determining the outcome of the conflict, as illustrated by the anecdote of 
the fly exhausting the dog that was recited in the first chapter. We see that the actors use hit 
and run tactics, playing to the strengths of a flexible network organization, and immerse 
themselves into the civilian population and their domains by using social media and news 
sites. The target selection, appearing random and of opportunity, may be just that. But this is 
also an example of guerrilla tactics where the warriors attack whatever facility or site 
possible. Nevertheless the growth in SEA’s sophistication may indicate a move towards an 
organization resembling the militias106 or private vigilante committees of the real world. The 
anti-regime groups’ lack of coordination, organization and resources make their strategy, or 
lack thereof, resembles “cyber hooligans” or “cyber vandals” that are less coordinated and 
operate at random. Lastly, the case study indicates that the various groups in the Syrian 
conflict enjoy and suffer much of the same realities as in the real world. The opposition 
suffers from internal disagreement and conflict, few resources and little human capital. In 
comparison the pro-regime faction appear stronger and has a strategic advantage despite its 
low level of sophistication. Though the effects of their campaigns are indefinite, it is clear 
that the SEA has a more holistic use of the guerrilla tactics discussed. The opposition appears 
less coordinated and dependent on foreign assistance, resembling groups not yet developed to 
the level of a cyber guerrilla.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Militias refer to a military force that is raised from the civil population to supplement a regular army in an 
emergency. It is therefore not synonym with the current SEA, but the group may evolve into something 
resembling this definition in the future.   
	   75	  
Until mid- 2013 the pro- and anti-regime groups pursued similar tactics of hacking each other 
and others. However, the case study shows that their targets have overall varied some. SEA 
and other pro-regime groups overall have focused on gaining attention by DDoS and 
defacement. The case study also demonstrates that the SEA evolved from late 2012 
throughout 2013, and has refocused their attacks to a more international profile, developed a 
higher level of organization, and formulated a holistic strategy. The anti-regime groups have 
however focused their hacking activity at obtaining and releasing private and government 
documents violations (SECDEV Foundation 2013b, 2–3) to embarrass the regime, publicize 
the motivation and behavior of the ruling elite, and attempt to force responsibility for human 
rights abuses. They have maintained visibility in the social media but as more traditional 
users, publishing statements and videos, not as competent hackers.  
 
Though not sufficient, cyberspace can provide a fruitful complementary domain of conflict, 
and there are both benefits and drawbacks of non-state actors as a part of a conflict strategy.  
Most of the benefits revolve around the low entry costs for small-scale attacks and the 
asymmetric advantages for attackers. Due to their lean organizational structure global effects 
can be achieved faster, cheaper and without limitations due to geography (Mulvenon and 
Rattray 2012a, 127–128). They are also easier recruited due to the lack of geographical 
constraints, little risk for life and health (at least outside the conflict zone), and the somewhat 
limited skills required. By the use of political online message boards and social media, 
hackers are able to recruit a large, ideologically motivated force at short notice. The flexible 
structure results in lacking potential for maintaining organization and united strategy as we 
see in the anti-regime faction. It makes it harder to maintain human capital, and there are 
fewer opportunities for educating “the next generation”. This reduces the embedded human 
capital and creates dependence on existing members’ competence. In the end this reduces 
organizational memory, and causes loss of information (Mulvenon and Rattray 2012b, 164). 
Due to the lack of coercive control and punishment, cost of deflection, and lack of centralized 
leadership, online social movements have weaknesses embedded in its structure. We see all 
these tendencies in the Syrian case.  
 
The anti-regime faction is weaker and gains less attention as they lack unity and cooperation. 
SEA has a greater focus on training, and we have seen in the case study that they are rather 
synchronized. The research also indicates that SEA uses many resources on training, and 
even established a hacker school to train volunteers. In the case of the anti-regime, this is 
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only recorded as provided by foreign assistance. The case study has shown that the guerrilla 
tactics are successful in the case of the SEA, that enjoys the most resources and organization, 
but the lack of coordination and unity hampers the work of the opposition. Equal to real 
world guerrilla warfare, cyber guerrillas depend on some level of organization to maximize 
the benefits of the strategy. Without this, their efforts are limited to that of vandals or 
hooligans voicing their opinions as individuals instead of as a force. However, it must be 
pointed out that this tentative conclusion only based on one case. It is likely that the SEA and 
the Assad regime cooperate to an unknown extent and, depending on the level, the 
comparison between SEA and the anti-regime non-state actors may be skewed. However, 
both the theoretical and empirical foundation demonstrates that SEA uses guerrilla tactics. 
The comparison is therefore right, as they both use the asymmetrical tactic and has no formal 
bonds with a government. If the links between the regime and SEA are as the opposition 
claims, the appropriate mirage would be the African guerrillas in Africa during the Cold War, 
enjoying support from the two super powers but with no formal links.  
 
As wee see, all the assumptions find some support in the Syrian case. It is clear that the non-
state actors are greatly involved in the cybered aspects of the conflict. They, to some extent, 
qualify as cyber guerrillas. Their attacks seem to indicate a subversive goal, based in the 
spread of strategic narratives and a relative soft power balance. However, an element of hard 
power is also found as surveillance and online impersonations are introduced. These tactics 
are based in fear, not perceived legitimacy in the recipient. We also see diverging levels of 
success in the campaigns launched by the non-state actors at both sides of the conflict. But, as 
pointed out at several occasions through this research project, any conclusions made here are 
indicative instead of definitive as the field is young and the empirical record is short. It 
therefore does not seek to make conclusions beyond the immediate empirical record collected 
for this thesis. Regardless, the support for the assumptions may indicate a potential 
framework for the growing presence of non-state actors in cyberspace. We will now evaluate 
to what extent Syria qualify as a cybered soft war.  
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Is it a soft war in Syrian cyberspace?  
This thesis has attempted to answer the: “Why and how does non-state actors use cyberspace 
in modern conflict?” To do so, it first had to establish that non-state actors use cyberspace in 
a conflict situation. It was foundational belief that was confirmed by the Syrian case, though 
few past studies focus on this kind of actors. Secondly, the case study asked why they use 
their scant resources in a domain unable to determine the course of a conflict. An indicative 
answer is that the goal is to subvert the opposition, be it pro- or anti-regime, but a conclusive 
answer cannot be given at the present time. What is more clear is that they, due to their 
relative power, use guerrilla tactics to push an agenda of soft wars; meaning strategic 
narratives to influence the soft power balance. The case study also shows that the domain 
favors an offensive strategy. Attackers spearhead attacks by choosing the time and place, thus 
forcing defense “everywhere”. If the aim is subversion, the number of potential targets is also 
close to endless. SEA illustrates this element with their global scope on potential victims. 
Attacker also “set the agenda” by deciding the scale and type of attack. These groups can 
therefore be valuable in a revolutionary setting to demonstrate cause, fellow supporters, and 
undermine the authority of the regime/ opposition by humiliation and delegitimizing tactics. 
This case study therefore clearly indicates that non-state actors use guerrilla tactics and can, 
like fleas on a dog, hurt the more powerful enemy. This gives them credence as actors on the 
political stage, and strengthens the importance of this thesis’ focus point. The Syrian actors 
have the means and a favorable environment, but this does not guarantee a successful use. 
The case study shows that in Syria we see that the non-state actors with regime allegiance 
have a higher empirical record and level of attention, but the materialization of desired effects 
are questionable. The case study, lastly, demonstrated the importance of resources and 
organization also in this domain. It therefore indicates that cyberspace is not neutral, where 
actors’ position is only determined by innovation. Instead one party to the conflict sets the 
parameter for operations and are able to limit both the reach and scope of the other. 
Traditional measurements of strength apply to this domain as the SEA dominates the current 
cyber conflict in Syria.  
 
Today, in Syria we see “cyber-armies”, both pro- and anti regime, waging organized (dis-) 
information campaigns in cyberspace. As this thesis have shown, both parties actively uses 
social media to “sell their story” to the domestic and global audience. Going beyond social 
media, they actively use hacking as a tool in conflict and manipulate how events are 
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perceived. These groups sabotage, persecute and spy on each other and perceived supporters 
by hacking accounts, defacing websites, and manipulating social media outlets. Pushing an 
agenda of subversion, it is more conflictual the past cybered conflicts in for example Estonia 
and Georgia. Their actions mirror traditional disinformation and propaganda campaigns, but 
the focus on the soft power balance resembles that of information warfare. The case study 
shows that the non-state actors and state actors both use the Internet to allot disinformation, 
shape public opinion, spread propaganda, and delegitimize opponent. The hackers voice their 
objections, create attention for their opinions, and build fear among the opposition. 
Additionally, cyberspace is shown to enable both extensive intelligence gathering and a new 
domain for the “battle of narrative”. Attention and influence is the life-blood of any 
movement, and as we have seen in this thesis the groups actively use cyberspace to form 
public opinion and the political agenda. However they only have limited, if any, physical 
consequences. The actors also have little control over effects, and cannot therefore be 
classified as powerful. This work concludes that the campaigns analyzed resemble more 
sabotage, vandalism and guerrilla warfare than traditional military action.  
 
If the will and the mind of the opponent is the target, then “softer tactics” are placed central 
stage. By framing attitudes and perceptions, battles can be won. This has been referred to as 
soft wars. We clearly see that the actions of the actors studied here are aimed at selling their 
version of reality to shape how events are interpreted. This is not a new phenomenon. As 
“representatives of the people”, “liberators” or “protectors”, combatants have justified why 
they engage in the violent spiral that is war. Through their narratives they build a version of 
reality, which is done to engage support, secure position and build legitimacy. They are 
engaged in what can be named “soft war”. They manipulate perceptions to an instrumental 
and political manner, and though not directly violent it targets the actual conflict. Thus they 
use guerrilla tactics to build a momentum and secure their place as “fish in the sea”. 
Additionally cyberspace acts as a force multiplier by allowing the non-state actors to create 
confusion and attack the enemy’s center of gravity. This case study thus concludes that 
cyberspace merely provides a new domain to do what has always been done, but its scope 
and low entry barrier allows for the entry of non-state actors to an extent not seen before. By 
focusing on cybered conflicts in a soft war perspective, why non-state actors chose to focus 
their scant resources in this domain is explained. The risks are lesser than in real world 
conflict, while the rewards may be great. Combining Rid’s arguments with Arreguin-Toft’s 
findings thus allows for an analytical framework to explain why Syrian non-state actors chose 
	   79	  
to spend resources in cyberspace despite its lack of lethal effects. By using cyberspace as a 
political and instrumental domain to shape perceptions, combating non-state actors may 
strengthen their position in real world conflicts.  
 
Attention is attention; cyber attacks become one way of being noticed among the many 
causes and groups in today’s interconnected world. Like protests, signature campaigns, 
vandalism and use of traditional media, cyber attacks are becoming a way to show defiance. 
You only need a few accomplished members, not all must be able to use the ”printing press” 
(develop the software) as long as there are some that can help spread the newspapers/ 
malware to the public. Removal of websites is comparable to censorship of newspapers and 
libraries in attempts to limit inputs and shape public opinion. Attacks undertaken may allow 
control of information, which in turn can hamper decision-making and/ or manipulate the 
behavior of opposing parties. The actions of the groups studied here can also be compared to 
how students or oppositions vandalize in real world conflicts to spread their message or gain 
attention of the public. SEA is especially accomplished in this type of work, and they have 
understood that attacking news media is an excellent way of gaining their attention. Not only 
do they get the attention of whoever visits a given webpage, but also by the mediums 
covering the story. In sum they force their way onto the front page. We therefore see clear 
indications that the Syrian cyber actors use this domain to influence domestic and 
international politics.  
 
The empirical record supports that cyber power and soft war allows for a holistic analysis of 
non-state actors similar to the past research into states. Cyberspace may force the behavior of 
others, either by preventative attacks like DDoS, which complicates coordination and 
organization, or psychologically by recruitment and sustainability of existing supporters. The 
attacks aim to create a perception of strength, and in the case of SEA result in more 
international attention than a group of its magnitude is entitled. The second face of cyber 
power, as envisioned by Nye (2010), is not found in the Syrian conflict. This is in hindsight 
logical, as we have seen that non-state actors have limited possibility to exclude potential 
strategies beyond DDoS (first face of cyberpower). The third face of cyberpower however is 
also present in the Syrian conflict, and it can be argued that the line between the second and 
third face is blurred in the Syrian case. As seen in the beginning of the thesis, the second face 
entailed exclusion of strategies while the third meant the change of preferences so some 
strategies were never considered. We see a growth in use of surveillance, which in turn 
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excludes potential strategies of adversaries. But it also may make the potential costs so great 
that the strategy is never considered. The identification and punishment of opposition 
members captured online have expansive effects, as potential anti-regime individuals will 
reconsider using software vulnerable for infiltration. As SEA is able to manipulate and 
infiltrate without the victims’ knowledge, it is likely that the anti-regime groups will “self-
censor” out of fear of retaliation.  
 
In sum this leads the opposition to miss out on the benefits of cyberspace seen in Egypt and 
Tunisia, possibly indicating a change in the “social media revolutions” sometimes accredited 
as the catalyzer for the Arab Spring. The truth to this claim is at best debated, but what is 
seen in the Syrian case is that cyberspace is manipulated and used against the opposition. 
Online impersonations, large-scale surveillance, and rumors of information sharing with the 
regime’s security services, most likely limits the effectiveness of the cyber domain for the 
opposition, again unlike the Egyptian and Tunisian case.  As we have seen there is also 
accusations claiming that the regime only allows social media sites as a way to entrap 
opposition members. This allows us to at least question if the Arab Spring’s most famous tool 
is now turned against them? Contrary to common belief, in Syria it does not necessarily 
provide a neutral domain but instead yet another battlefield. 
 
The case study has demonstrated that in a conflict over hearts and minds creating a perceived 
winner is vital. Cyber actors therefore matter as they can be used to build perceptions. When 
building a narrative, common tactics are the presentation of imminent threats and catastrophic 
potential consequences, reports of attacks and abuse, vilification of the opponent, and declare 
opposition as the only viable position (Nissen 2013).  All of these are used by the actors in 
the Syrian cybered conflict, and after two years this pattern in clearly identifiable. There is an 
ongoing battle of perception and narrative between the parties, both targeting the population 
and the international audience(see also Nissen 2013). The argumentation either builds on the 
legitimate right to uphold law and peace in the sovereign territory, or the right to rebel against 
unjust leaders. The enemy is either described as foreign-backed criminals without respect for 
law and order, or as maniac regime run by corruption and oppression. Both use video and 
photos actively to present stories and evidence supporting their narrative. Common is also 
proof of inhumane behavior at the hand of the other, thus legitimizing the struggle for 
survival of the sender and use of extraordinary means. By claiming that the opposition is 
supported and lead by foreign powers, the SEA may undermine the revolution’s legitimacy as 
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“representatives of the people”. Secondly, its’ cyber operations build a perception that the 
regime is still strong and should be feared. Thirdly, by spreading accusations of human rights 
violations at the hand of the opposition the regime can undermine their moral authority as 
protesters against a despotic regime. The potential for hacking user accounts in ICT and 
social media, and to give damaging information to the regime; may prevent activists for using 
these channels and thus limiting their potential for coordination and influence.  In total, these 
factors may contribute to regime recruitment or passivity in the citizenry but obviously these 
effects are next to impossible to measure at the current time and are therefore simply 
speculations. Syria becomes therefore the last chapter in a trend prominent over the last 15-20 
years: the increased focus on the informational parts of warfare as seen in Yugoslavia, 
Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq and Somalia (Nissen 2013, 89). Due to technological advancements 
this also happens with unprecedented scope and speed.  
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Final thoughts   
 
Kosovo was described as the first War on the Internet (Denning 1999, 1), but this thesis has 
shown the development of cybered conflicts is moving rapidly. We see the multiple types of 
conflicts that exist today107, and cyberspace’s role varies depending on the circumstances. In 
many non-internationalized conflicts, the effects of cyberspace are minimal in the 
Clausewitzian sense. It is yet to be demonstrated that non-state actors can have disruptive 
effects on a state by cyber operations (Geiss 2013, 5).  However the use of cyberspace as an 
integrated part of strategy increases the importance of the domain, and may in the greatest 
consequence have violent ramifications. Several cases studies show the effectiveness of the 
Internet for activism, especially in combination with other types of mass media and a clear 
political agenda. There should be therefore no surprise that the Internet has become a popular 
tool among activists from around the globe with all types of motivations. To quote Denning 
(1999):  
 
It facilitates activities such as educating the public and media, raising money, forming 
coalitions across geographical boundaries, distributing petitions and action alerts, and 
planning and coordinating events on a regional or international level.  
 
Manipulating ICT allows for diffusion of command, targeting of opposing narratives and 
“custom-made” narratives targeted at the different groups of recipient. When traditional 
media dominated, there were only a few reporters present when an event took place. Today, 
any individual with a smart-phone can be a reporter and therefore create propaganda, secure 
communication, gather intelligence, and apply for funds. Whine (1999, 238) therefore 
concludes that ICT has assisted in a shift of non-state organization from hierarchical to 
hydra-headed networks, similar to what Joseph Nye’s dubbed “diffusion of power” . This 
shift, with a growing number of actors and parties to a conflict, is clearly present in this case 
study. It finds that the structure of cyberspace both encourage and facilitates the presence and 
involvement of non-state actors. Thus the strategy of a coordinated narrative may be 
complicated, but the potential for alterations and supportive “proof” of one’s point of view is 
much greater. In sum, It is therefore clear that ICT is becoming a battleground for the “hearts 
of the minds”, where competing narratives seeks to sway the targeted population.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 E.g. low-intensity armed conflicts between organized armed groups in failed-State scenarios like Somalia, 
“traditional types of civil war” like the ongoing, armed conflict in Syria, “internationalized” scenarios like in 
Afghanistan (Quote from Geiss, 2013).  
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Joseph Nye Jr. states that future conflict will be characterized by “states will remain the 
dominant actors on the world stage, but they will find the stage far more crowded and 
difficult to control” (quoted in Mulvenon and Rattray 2012a, xii). As the literature referred 
illustrates, former studies have tended to focus on state actors in cyberspace, or non-state 
actors in traditional forms of conflict. However non-state actors are becoming a force and 
require scrutiny. The combination of the non-lethal nature of cyberspace, the great demand of 
resources to yield significant effects, and the low cost of entry adds up to the conclusions that 
non-state actors will utilize cyberspace. However, it is likely that it will be utilized as a 
medium to drum up support, engaging in the battle of the narrative, and soft wars as in this 
case study and not in the hope of yielding determining effects in real wars. However, this 
field of study is to young to make any conclusive recommendations concerning a whole area 
of research. It therefore does not seek to make conclusions beyond the immediate empirical 
record collected for this thesis. Regardless, the support for the assumptions may indicate a 
potential framework for the growing presence of non-state actors in cyberspace. But much 
research is needed before any theory can be developed. However, this thesis demonstrates 
that many insights to real world conflicts can be transferred to those in cyberspace. It simply 
offers a new domain and does not fundamentally alter the ways of conflict.  
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Appendix  
The complete record of the empirical data collected is submitted to the University of Oslo’s, 
Institute of Political Science Administration together with this thesis on the 23rd of May 2014. 
It is collected in a excel document which is too big for printing in a Word format. It is 
therefore delivered on a memory stick, one copy, in accordance with UiO rules. Additional 
copies can be requested to the author at vivi.ringnes@gmail.com.   
 
